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This thesis examines the wartime actions and strategies of Salvadoran General 
Roberto D’Aubuisson, a prominent right-wing leader during the Salvadoran Civil War. 
Major D’Aubuisson was accused of numerous human rights abuses both directly and 
indirectly through his ties with paramilitary death squads and corrupt political regimes. 
The purpose of this work is to analyze how D’Aubuisson was able to rise to political 
prominence and amass significant influence during the war despite his alleged ties to 
illegal activities and human rights abuses. I use this analysis to determine how 
D’Aubuisson’s role helped expose the weaknesses of the Salvadoran state, and what that 
meant for the future of the country in its post-war recovery. My primary research 
strategy is a qualitative analysis of historical documentation from various media outlets, 
such as newspapers and radio interviews, as well as U.S. and Salvadoran government 
archives and personal testimonials of Salvadoran citizens from the wartime period of 
1979-1992. I use this data to piece together the various roles D’Aubuisson played in the 
Civil War and the circumstances surrounding his rise to power. By examining the 
personal, domestic, and global circumstances that allowed D’Aubuisson to rise to 
prominence El Salvador, I reveal the core issues in the country that have impacted its 
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 Many countries face central issues within their economic, political, and social 
environments that prevent them from achieving at least some degree of peace. 
Instability in a state can lead to conflicts that devastate and worsen existing situations. 
When a state does not address or look to fundamental issues, it is difficult to achieve 
solace for its citizens. Often, the focus remains on repairing what the conflict caused, 
rather than what started it. However, it is not always simple to find what creates a war-
torn country. In countries with a history war-torn conflict, a careful analysis of a 
prominent leader’s rise to power can potentially reveal these fundamental issues. 
Instead of looking at what a country’s war has caused, we can look at the circumstances 
and methods that allow for certain leaders to rise amid the conflict. These circumstances 
can be telling of a broader picture for a state as a whole.  
To exemplify this idea, I have chosen an example analysis of a leader’s rise among 
a violent conflict. From 1979 to 1992, El Salvador suffered from a brutal civil war that 
cost over 70,000 lives. Mass killings, forced disappearances, kidnapping, and torture 
became commonplace for over a decade, largely at the hands of right-wing death 
squads, or paramilitary groups that acted as subdivisions of the government’s military 
forces. At the head was former-military major Roberto D’Aubuisson, a man who rose to 
great prominence in El Salvador and had significant influence over civilians, military 
forces, and the political right-wing. D’Aubuisson was accused of many human rights 
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abuses but maintained a prominent standing in El Salvador. He had an expansive 
following and maintained support despite consistent allegations of crimes. In looking at 
the circumstances in El Salvador before and during the war, and D’Aubuisson’s own 
methods of influence, we can assess the broader, core issues of the country. By 
analyzing the ways in which D’Aubuisson secured and maintained power, we can 
understand why certain problems and situations still exist in El Salvador today, hindering 
























Part One: Instability– Foundations that Paved the Way for D’Aubuisson 
 
The Salvadoran Left vs. the Salvadoran Right 
 
Origins: The Salvadoran Oligarchy 
 
 
 El Salvador’s political divisions that began in the late 19th century were a direct 
reflection of its domestic economic tensions. Although the country has certainly seen 
socioeconomic improvements in recent decades, a significant disparity in the 
distribution of wealth between the country’s landowning and working classes has 
existed for over a century and a half (Nohlen). This income disparity is rooted in the 
existence of a group of families known as “Las Catorce Familias,” (Fourteen Families) 
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who gained control of El Salvador’s coffee production during the late 19th century 
(Haggerty). Though the number of families was closer to several hundred, the term was 
coined to identify a select number of landowners who profited from the sharp increase 
in coffee prices in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The value of coffee grew by 
1100% and accounted for an average of 58.7% of the nation’s income between 1880 
and 1914 (Haggerty). El Salvador’s agricultural economy allowed the Familias to use the 
significant wealth gained from coffee production to expand their economic control. For 
the next century, 60% of the nation’s land, 50% of its income, and the entirety of its 
banking system would be in the hands of only a few thousand people (“Oligarchs and 
Officers”). “It’s an oligarchy because these families own and run almost everything that 
makes money in El Salvador,” said oligarch Jorge Sol Costellanos in a 1981 interview. 
“Coffee gave birth to the oligarchy…and economic growth has revolved around them 
ever since” (Hoeffel). 
 The country’s dense population exacerbated social tensions. By 1980, it had the 
densest population in Latin America with 600 people per square mile. Approximately 
26% of rural families did not own land and another 60.6% owned too little to support a 
family (Burke). What the campesinos, or peasant farmers, did own was mostly due to the 
country’s feudalistic origins that granted them milpas, or small portions of land. With 
the majority of the nation’s land and wealth in the hands of a few families, ideological 
division became deep. The asymmetric distribution of land ownership translated into an 
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asymmetric distribution of political power (Mason). The left became comprised of 
peasant laborers. The right became an amalgamation of wealthy aristocrats and military 
officers who helped oligarchs maintain and expand their landholdings. With the 
oligarchy’s political objective of preventing a class war and the military’s suppression of 
any challenge to the established order, decades of authoritarian rule ensued (LeoGrand, 
Our Own Backyard 43). 
 
Origins: The Rise of Military Force 
 
 
El Salvador experienced civil strife in the early 20th century due to the economic 
and political power of the Familias. Despite these prevalent divisions, however, the 
country was still a representative democracy as of 1841, and male citizens of all 
socioeconomic status were able to voice their oppositions to at least to some degree. It 
was not until El Salvador’s first dictatorship that these voices would be stifled, and the 
military repression would lead to decades of suppression.  
On December 2nd, 1931, the Salvadoran armed forces rose to power for the first 
time when it overthrew the country’s first democratically elected President, Arturo 
Araújo Fajardo. The military appointed Fajardo’s Vice President, General Maximilliano 
Hernández Martínez, as Acting President. He founded the National Pro-Patria Party 
(PNPP), a far-right nationalist party that catered specifically to General Hernández’s 
policies and rule. Despite promises to hold a nationwide legislative election in January of 
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1932, General Hernández, with the support of the oligarchs, canceled all election results 
after learning that the Communist Party of El Salvador had won several municipalities. 
Subsequent elections were cancelled, and Martinez targeted prominent communist 
leaders. These actions led to the formation of a peasant uprising, organized by 
communist activists. Amongst them was Agustín Farabundo Martí, a prominent leader 
who would inspire the formation of one of El Salvador’s most prominent guerilla groups 
decades later.  
The uprising of Communist supports and peasants occurred on January 22nd, 
1932 in various cities across Western El Salvador and resulted in the killing of an 
estimated 100 people. Government forces responded with brute force, killing an 
estimated 30,000 peasants.  The uprising, called “La Mantanza” (Massacre) marked the 
first instance of widespread military violence against the population and set the stage 
for decades of violence. The event certainly foreshadowed the later explosion of 
ideological tensions that led to the start of the Salvadoran Civil War in 1979, where mass 
killings would occur in far greater numbers.  
General Hernández remained in power until 1944. Though elections still occurred, 
Hernández ran unopposed and results were often not publicized (Nohlen). This pattern 
of illegitimacy continued as military groups and leaders vied for power.  
 
Enter the Political Parties: PCN vs. PDC 
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 Following its first military dictatorship, El Salvador experienced years of shifting 
political leadership. All under military command, various political parties ruled for 
varying periods of time. By the 1970s, however, the National Conciliation Party (PCN) 
and the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) had become El Salvador’s first consistent 
political representatives. The PCN held the presidency from 1962 until 1979, but the PDC 
attracted consistent, widespread support and controlled numerous seats in the National 
Assembly as well as control over many municipalities (Montgomery 37). Tensions would 
come to a head in the 1972 election, when the PCN faced electoral defeat, and the 
conflict over who had won the election set the stage for the coup that started the civil 
war in 1979. 
1960s Origins 
 The PDC was formed after the Communist Revolution in Cuba as an opportunity 
for the Salvadoran political system to find a balance between movements towards a 
leftist revolution and the continuation of far right-wing dictatorships. The party hoped 
to promote reform through moderate and Catholic-based policies (Montgomery 54). 
Originating as a faction of the PDC, the PCN split off in the late 1960s to promote more 
aggressive, conservative forms of social and economic policies in El Salvador. Though 
both parties were rooted in anticommunism and comprised of Christian Democrats, the 
PCN promoted more radical forms of counterinsurgency while the PDC retained a more 
centrist position. Both had strong support, and despite the PCN’s majorities in terms of 
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National Assembly seat, number of municipalities, and popular votes for presidential 
elections, the PDC was never far behind. The party came within two seats of the National 
Assembly majority, maintained approximately a third of the popular vote, and governed 
the country’s largest cities, including the capital, San Salvador (Webre). As political 




 Amid the power struggles between political parties, the ruling elite maintained 
their power through widening class divisions. Campesinos, or peasant farmers, saw their 
landholdings dwindle by the mid-1970s. A 1965 minimum wage law practically 
abolished El Salvador’s feudal system. The provision of milpas was discouraged, and the 
aparcero was “expected to become a laborer whose sole connection with the property 
that he worked on [was] the wage paid to him by the owner” (Browning). When 
Honduras imposed its own agrarian reform laws in April 1969, the landless population in 
El Salvador, having already risen from domestic policies, grew even further 
(Montgomery 76). The two countries were already facing economic tensions with El 
Salvador due to their having formed the Central American Common Market (CACM). 
The organization promoted free trade and economic integration in the region, but also 
caused Honduras to suffer from a trade deficit with its partners. 
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The negative state of affairs led to Honduras’ realization that it was essentially 
subsidizing industrial development in El Salvador through the various economic reforms 
put in place by the CACM. This led to a mounting of frustration within Honduras, 
prompting agrarian reform legislation that forced 300,000 Salvadoran farmers out from 
the country (Bachmura). The farmers were notified that they had 30 days to leave the 
country, and with little land opportunity in their home country, El Salvador’s class 
tensions were increased even further. Between 1961 and 1975, the percentage of 
landless rural Salvadorans increased from 11.9% to 40.9% (8). Since 58.5% of El 
Salvador’s population were peasants, this meant that approximately 994,000 people, or 
almost one quarter of the population, were landless (“Rural Population”).  
 
 
The 1970 and 1972 Elections 
Economic downturn in the late 1960’s caused market prices for coffee to sharply 
decline, along with private investment. Sugar cane surpluses also rose as global demand 
fell, and drought and disease were rampant. International debt subsequently rose along 
with these troubles (Montgomery 60). Unemployment grew as well, and with regional 
tensions worsening economic hardships, the state of the economy prompted the 
National Assembly to call for a National Agrarian Reform Congress in January 1970. 
Both the PCN and opposition parties, as well as the president at the time General Fidel 
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Sánchez Hernández, had agrarian reform legislation on the agenda, and the events of 
1969 prompted swift action.  
The private sector members of the Assembly, who were part of the PCN, 
vehemently opposed agrarian reform. Delegates identified the concentration of land in 
the hands of few individuals as the major barrier to employment in the country. They 
favored “massive expropriation in favor of the common good” to promote the 
development of resources and increase employment (Economía Salvadoreña 109). 
Without the support of oligarch representatives, the majority of delegates believed 
increased peasant participation in the workforce required government restraint of 
hacendados, or owners of haciendas, as well as their allies in the Armed Forces 
(Economía Salvadoreña 114).   
The progressive sentiments of the Assembly had the opposite impact in 
Salvadoran politics. Agrarian reform would not come up again until years later. When 
legislative elections were held two months later, the PDC lost 70 of the 78 municipalities 
it had won 2 years earlier, and its National Assembly seats went from nearly half to less 
than a third (21). Despite proven election fraud by the PCN, these significant losses 
prompted the formation of a coalition between the PDC and other opposition parties 
going into the 1972 election (El Salvador: Significant Political Actors 3).  
 
UNO vs. PCN 
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In September 1971, the PDC formed a coalition with other Christian Democratic 
parties to form the National Opposition Union (UNO). Despite the more leftist beliefs of 
some of the members, the PDC was able to direct the party platform as it was the 
largest and most supported party of the three (Haggerty). The UNO’s manifesto stated 
the following: 
We have a common goal capable of transcending the problem of differences of 
ideology and strategy; we desire a positive change in the existing structures of 
political and economic power which have demonstrated their injustice and have 
had a clearly retrogressive effect on our development. (Webre 158) 
 
On the ticket for the new UNO party was José Napoleón Duarte, the mayor of San 
Salvador and a long-time member of the PDC. As was custom in his party, President 
Sánchez Hernández selected his successor to the PCN and leader of the army. He chose 
his chief of staff, Colonel Arturo Armando Molina.  
The presidential campaign was dangerous for the opposition. Many UNO leaders 
claimed numerous incidents of harassment, kidnapping, and assault (Haggerty). In 
December 1971, unidentified assailants fired upon Duarte’s campaign caravan and the 
driver in the lead car was killed.  Tensions mounted as both sides feared for the 
opposition’s victory, and this set the stage for election day. In San Salvador, where 30% 
of registered voters resided, Duarte won two to one, offsetting the PCN’s stronghold in 
rural areas. The final counts differed from both sides. According to a 1984 CIA report 
over Salvadoran political actors, Duarte and the UNO had the clear victory directly based 
off electoral board counts. However, with pressure from the military to recount the 
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votes, the electoral commission claimed that without an absolute majority the election 
had to be deferred to the PNC-dominated National Assembly. Delegates declared 
Molina the winner, and this sparked a wave of mass unrest.  
 
The 1977 State-of-Siege 
Only weeks after the 1972 election, rebels within the military attempted a coup 
on then-President Sánchez, but with the majority of the military still in support of the 
government, it was unsuccessful. Having expressed support for the rebel regime, Duarte 
was then exiled from the country and sought refuge in Venezuela under their Christian-
Democratic regime (Duarte 79). In the years after, social unrest worsened, and 
paramilitaries on both sides of the ideological spectrum formed. Ballot manipulation 
became more flagrant with each legislative election. Opposition parties declined to 
participate in the 1976 elections on the basis that it was “pointless” (Haggerty). 
Antigovernment demonstrations became more frequent, and the responses of the 
government grew more violent and repressive. On multiple occasions, the military fired 
upon protestors in the capital.  
Elections were held on February 20, 1977, and the same pattern of fraudulency 
occurred. “Voting was impeded from early morning when the ballot boxes were found 
stuffed with ballots marked for the official party” wrote former Vice Minister of Defense 
Mariano Castro Morán, “…violence was used…to prevent voting, to stuff ballot boxes, 
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and to alter votes” (Morán). In a tape recording presented to members of the U.S. 
Congress, broadcasts by the PCN referred to election day as “stuffing tamales in the 
tanks,” meaning “stuffing fraudulent votes in the ballot boxes” explained William Brown 
of the Washington Office on Latin America (Diuguld). Despite the physical removal of 
UNO poll watchers at various polling places, many locations still showed the UNO’s 
candidate, retired Colonel Ernesto Claramount, with a high margin of lead (Duarte 197). 
The blatant fraud prompted the UNO candidates and 15,000 supporters to gather in the 
Plaza Libertad in San Salvador. After 3 days, the crowd had grown to more than 50,000, 
prompting the National Police to approach the scene in armored cars and to fire upon 
the demonstrators, leaving fifty dead (Montgomery 72).  
After the events at Plaza Libertad, the government immediately declared a state-
of-siege, which barred any Salvadorans from entering or leaving the country, placed 
news outlets under government control, and limited gatherings to three people or less. 
Colonel Claramount fled to Costa Rica, and PCN candidate General Carlos Humberto 
Romero was declared the victor (“6 Killed in El Salvador”).  
President Romero ended the state-of-siege upon his ascension into office in an 
effort to show support for increased attention on human rights in the country. In reality, 
however, his actions would prove to severely worsen the situation. In November of 1977, 
Romero had the National Assembly propagate the Law for the Defense and Guarantee 
of the Public Order, giving the government practically carte blanche arrest and 
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detention powers for any persons or act it deemed contrary to national interest or 
“against the existence and organization of the state” (DeYoung). After this order was put 
into place, the number of disappeared persons more than doubled, and political 
assassinations increased ten times (Bonner) and for the next two years, the tumultuous 
battle between the left and the right produced even more mass demonstrations, 







 As the rift between the left and right-wing factions of El Salvador caused political 
turmoil, civil violence expanded. The formation of paramilitary groups actually 
originated in the 1960s, deriving from US military policy beginning with President 
Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress Initiative. Chairing a meeting of Central American 
presidents in March 1963, President Kennedy stated that “communism is the chief 
obstacle to economic development” in the Declaration of José and motioned for a 
military coalition between US and Central American forces to subdue communist 
influence (Nairn). The Declaration prompted a series of follow-up meetings between 
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Central American ministers of the interior, who held the jurisdiction over internal 
security and policing. The US State Department organized and held these meetings, with 
assistance from other departments such as the CIA, AID, and the Justice Department. 
William Bowdler, who represented the State Department at these meetings, described 
them as “designed to develop ways of dealing with subversion” (Nairn).  
 
ORDEN and ANSESAL 
 The US, leading the creation of forces to subdue communism in El Salvador, 
assigned General José Alberto Medrano, a revered senior officer of the Salvadoran 
National Guard, to oversee the development of security forces in El Salvador (18). This 
led to the creation of ORDEN (Organización Democrática Nacionalista, or National 
Democratic Organization), a paramilitary and intelligence organization that was created 
to “use clandestine terror against government opponents” (Amnesty International). It 
operated primarily in the rural areas of El Salvador (Amnesty International). ORDEN was 
an auxiliary paramilitary arm of la Casa Presidencial, or the executive offices of the 
government, with the stated objective to “indoctrinate the peasants regarding the 
advantages of the democratic system and the disadvantages of the communist system,” 
according to Medrano (Montgomery 50). ORDEN personnel in rural El Salvador 
gathered detailed information on suspected dissidents in rural El Salvador and sent this 
information to ANSESAL (National Security Agency of El Salvador), the presidential 
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intelligence service that relied on ORDEN’s Death Squads as “the operative arm of 
intelligence gathering” (Nairn). According to Amnesty International, “innumerable 
reports” named ORDEN personnel as having assisted security forces in identifying, 
detaining, and murdering suspected “subversives” (Amnesty International). It claimed 
ORDEN was directly connected to hundreds of killings during this six-month period 
(Amnesty International).  
 
Other Groups 
The social and political turmoil of the 1960s and 1970s prompted the formation 
of other right-wing paramilitary groups. After ORDEN came Mano Blanco (White Hand). 
Originating in Guatemala during the first decade of the country’s Civil War in the 1960s, 
the group was, according to former U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador, Raul H. Castro, “an 
offshoot of ORDEN…the same people in ORDEN were to some extent the same people 
in Mano Blanco.” (Nairn). Castro described Mano Blanco as “nothing less than the birth 
of Death Squads” in the country (Dickey, Behind the Death Squads).  
Other death squads formed as well. The 1970s saw the formation of the White 
Warriors Union, with Roberto D’Aubuisson as the alleged founder (Brinkley). There was 
also the General Maximiliano Hernández Martínez Anti-Communist Brigade, the Secret 
Anti-Communist Army (ESA), and the Anticommunist Wars of Elimination Liberation 
Armed Forces. According to the CIA, these death squads “made a public example of 
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their victims, who were often tortured to death or executed, and dumped in public 
places” and were considered “publicity seeking” (Briefing Paper). However, a great 
number of death squads existed that “used no title and, apart from the evidence of 
torture, left no indication of its responsibility” (Briefing Paper). The report also claimed 
that “most of those killed by right-wing death squads appear to be victims of this latter 
type” (Briefing Paper). Whether titled or not, these groups had essential characteristics in 
common: they were connected with army officers; they received money from various 
members of the oligarchy; and their members consisted of National Guardsmen and 
National Police, supplemented by ORDEN members, mercenaries, and members of the 
oligarchy (Montgomery 61). Rene Hurtado, the pseudonym for a former member of the 
El Salvador’s Treasury Police, another offshoot of the government’s security forces, 
recounted the following to journalist Allan Nairn: 
In general, you will kill the prisoners because there’s an assumption they shouldn’t 
live. If we pass them to the judge, they’ll go free and maybe have to pick them up 
again. If there’s lots of pressure—like from Amnesty International or some foreign 
countries—then we might pass them on to a judge, but if there’s no pressure, then 
they’re dead. When it’s over, you just throw him in the alleys with a sign saying 
Mano Blanco, ESA, or Maximiliano Hernandez Brigade. (Nairn) 
 
Though Death Squads gained prominence during El Salvador’s war, they originated in 
the turmoil of the country in the decades before.  
 
D’Aubuisson—Before the War 
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 As the right-wing of El Salvador expanded and rose to greater prominence, a 
young soldier, Roberto D’Aubuisson, rose with it. After entering El Salvador’s Escuela 
Militar in 1969 at the age of sixteen, his sister Marisa recalled that “for [her], Roberto 
was shaped and deformed” by the training (Andréu). She stated that upon graduating at 
eighteen, he was sent to the National Guard of El Salvador and subsequently was 
trained at the School of the Americas in both Washington D.C. and Panama. “We already 
knew what that was about: training the military to defend the issue of the Cold War,” 
she explained, “I did not share in what the military and ORDEN were doing, Roberto was 
very close to that organization…we were all communists to them, the only ones who 
were right were the military, the oligarchies, and the private companies” (Andréu).  
Marisa described how his training and service allowed him to fully commit to his beliefs. 
After that, “he defended his arguments…forever” (Andréu). 
 After his attendance at the School of the Americas, D’Aubuisson rose to military 
prominence. A protégé of General Medrano, who described him as “a fine officer who 
was loved by the people” and one of “my tres asesinos” (three murderers, referring to 
Medrano’s top 3 aides), D’Aubuisson rose in the ranks of the National Guard. He 
organized ORDEN chapters and eventually becoming Deputy Director (second in 
command) of El Salvador’s intelligence agency, ANSESAL (Nairn). D’Aubuisson worked 
directly under ANSESAL’s director, Roberto Eulaio Santivanez, whom a US embassy 
official called “President Romero’s black man” for “taking care of people when there was 
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dirty work to be done” (Nairn). Santivanez was recorded saying in a previously-
anonymous 1984 New York Times interview that D’Aubuisson was “the man who 
organized and [continued] to direct the squads” (Kinzer, “EX-AIDE IN SALVADOR”). He 
called him an “anarchic psychopath” whose “uncontrollable violence would consume El 
Salvador” (Kinzer, “EX-AIDE IN SALVADOR”). Journalist Allan Nairn described the Death 
Squad phenomenon as a “sprawling institution with tens of thousands of victims” that 
was the personal instrument of “one diabolical man,” referring to D’Aubuisson (Nairn).   
D’Aubuisson retained his position in ANSESAL until 1979. when the new junta 
dismantled the organization along with ORDEN for its ties to death squad killings under 
the Romero administration. However, this would not be the end of D’Aubuisson’s reign 
over Salvdoran military intelligence. Only days after the dismantling, D’Aubuisson 
moved all of the files from ANSESAL to the junta’s army headquarters, making copies for 
himself, and reorganized the institution under a new name, the National Intelligence 
Agency (ANI) (Montgomery 76). He would preside over this until creating his own 
political party, ARENA, in 1981. From this point, he would climb the ranks of Salvadoran 
politics, continuing the work he had started years before with ANSESAL. 
 
Global Context: The Cold War 
 From 1948 onward, the geopolitical rivalry between the United States and the 
Soviet Union dominated global discourse, diplomacy, and military action. The primary 
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goal of U.S. foreign policy was to curtail the rise of communism and limit the spread of 
Soviet influence, while the Soviet Union sponsored leftist uprisings. Existing tensions 
between right and left ideologies in various regions, such as Latin America, Africa, and 
Southeast Asia, were exacerbated as the two dominant global powers strove to keep the 
other’s ideologic influence at bay. Countries that were already enduring social and 
political instability were used as proxy battlegrounds. Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union 
prioritized the promotion of their ideological beliefs in already tumultuous countries.  
Despite the geographic origins of the conflict in Europe, the Cold War spread both fear 
and hope across the globe. In politically and socially unstable countries, especially where 
corruption ran rampant, those on the left saw an opportunity for reform and those on 
the right saw the potential for chaos ensue. The result was an ensuing battle of 




The JRG and D’Aubuisson’s Attempted Coups 
 Throughout 1979, simultaneous advances toward revolution occurred in both 
Nicaragua and El Salvador. When the Sandinistas overthrew Nicaraguan President 
Anastasio Somoza in September 1979, a coalition of Salvadoran military officers felt they 
needed a stronger government to prevent a similar revolution from happening in El 
Salvador. Colonels Majano Ramos, Jaime Gutiérrez Avendaño, and three civilian PDC 
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members subsequently removed President Romero in a coup d’état on October 15, 
1979. This was the start of El Salvador’s Civil War.  
The leaders established the Revolutionary Government Juna (JRG). They 
described themselves as a “reformist” junta with promises to instill expansive change 
such as agrarian reform, lower consumer prices, and increased wages (18). These 
reforms were designed to “take some of the steam away from leftist appeals to El 
Salvador’s oppressed peasants and laborers” according to journalist Christopher Dickey 
(“Civil War in El Salvador”). In what would only be the first of multiple juntas, leaders 
took reaching steps in abolishing ORDEN, dismissing “hardliner” members of the 
National Guard, such as Roberto D’Aubuisson (“D’Aubuisson Once Called”), and creating 
a new human rights commission to curb paramilitary death squads. Though more 
moderate compared to other groups at the time, the JRG was still determined to curb 
leftist influence and committed atrocities via its own death squads. By the end of the 
month, the Army and National Guard killed over 100 civilians (Haggerty).  
The first junta of El Salvador’s war inevitably created a 3-sided conflict: on one 
side was the far-right, comprised of oligarchy members and hardliner military men who 
wanted to regain the control of the government; on another was the revolutionary 
guerillas of the far-left who called for widespread reform; and on the last was the PDC’s 
moderate left and governing junta, who carefully tried to manage the desires of their 
extremist compatriots (Dickey, “Civil War in El Salvador”). With discord raging on all 
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sides of El Salvador, over half the members of the junta resigned, prompting the 
creation of a new ruling group under the JRG in January of 1980.   
A month after the creation of the JRG’s second junta, Major Roberto D’Aubuisson 
was arrested for defamation after publicly claiming El Salvador’s Attorney General, Dr. 
Mario Zamora, was a liaison between the PDC and the Farabundo Marti Popular 
Liberation Force (FPL), a leftist guerilla organization (“Attorney General Files Charges”). 
Three days later, assassins broke into Dr. Zamora’s home and killed him. The PDC and 
other popular organizations accused D’Aubuisson of masterminding the plot and were 
further convinced after he failed to show for testimony against the charge (Orellana). A 
month later, Archbishop Oscár Romero, an outspoken leader condemning right-wing 
forces, was assassinated while celebrating mass. Weeks after, a leftist revolutionary 
group claimed D’Aubuisson was plotting an attempted coup with oligarchs and military 
officials. The army consequently arrested D’Aubuisson along with other plot-members 
during a farm raid where the group was said to be planning their attempt. During the 
raid officials found documents directly linking D’Aubuisson to the organization of 
Archbishop Romero’s murder (Bonner). Despite Colonel Majano’s claim that the junta 
had evidence of D’Aubuisson’s role in the crimes, an army major who was part of 
D’Aubuisson’s tanda, or military class, was appointed to the case and released 
D’Aubuisson and his cohorts, claiming a lack of evidence (Bonner). When confronted on 
the issue, D’Aubuisson stated that a coup “would have a negative effect on both 
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[himself] and the armed forces” and that he and the other officers arrested “were only 
celebrating Soldiers Day” at the farm (Aldana).  
D’Aubuisson had already made clear moves to organize the right against the 
junta. Along with other far-right figures, he organized the National Broad Front (FAN) to 
“present an alternative to the government… that [would be] more effective and 
responsible than what is being done” (“D’Aubuisson Forecasts Leftwing Violence”). He 
explained that allegations of a coup plot were simply “rumors” based on the junta not 
“bothering to hear alternatives” (“D’Aubuisson Forecasts Leftwing Violence”). However, 
shortly after his release from prison he was caught distributing a videocassette of 
himself to active military officers in which he accused the junta of “being sympathetic to 
communist guerrillas” and calling for a right-wing coup (“D’Aubuisson Once Called”). 
When it became clear that he would not achieve right-wing control by direct force, 












Part Two: The War and D’Aubuisson’s 3 Points of Influence 
 
1. Manipulation 
 Leaders often employ some degree of manipulation, adapting their rhetoric to 
attain positive sentiment from a group, often lying or framing their views to mislead. A 
degree of dishonesty may be deemed necessary for many reasons, but the core 
motivation rest in the perpetrator’s belief that only they can do what is best, whether it 
be for the public or themselves. In order to gain a wide following, a person must find a 
way to make their views appealing to someone typically would not agree with them. 
Roberto D’Aubuisson employed this tactic greatly as he addressed his critics and the 
people of El Salvador. He claimed he only understood the necessary path to achieve 
peace and prosperity in the country. Taking advantage of the Western fear of 
communism that the Cold War created, D’Aubuisson used persuasive rhetoric to 
convince El Salvador’s citizens that his nationalist beliefs were the only means save the 
country from destruction. He had various avenues through which he achieved this, and it 
allowed him to be seen as a great leader who is still revered by many today despite his 
now-proven ties human rights atrocities.    
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A Deep-Rooted Hatred for Communism 
  Within the first year of the war, Roberto D’Aubuisson amassed a wide following 
in El Salvador and the global Cold War conflict fueled his pursuit of power. With his 
knowledge from military and national intelligence experience, D’Aubuisson said he saw 
“cracks” in El Salvador society that allowed leftist thought to deceive people. “It was my 
task to stop the communist avalanche” said D’Aubuisson, referring to his election as 
president of El Salvador’s Constituent Assembly in 1982 (Stackl). Like many leaders in 
the western hemisphere, D’Aubuisson felt that communism, or any facet of leftist 
thought, would tear down the democratic institutions of the state and take away 
citizens’ freedoms. This notion was clear via his ties to attempted coups against the JRG 
and PDC, despite the groups’ shared commitment to suppressing leftist insurrection 
(Montgomery 161). D’Aubuisson exploited the division created by the U.S.-Soviet 
conflict and poised himself on the side he felt represented moral justice. He attacked 
any groups associated with leftist thought in his speeches and claimed they would lead 
El Salvador into ruins (Montomgery 158). In a 1989 press release, D’Aubuisson had the 
following to response to reporters asking why the FMLN disliked him so fervently: 
I am an enemy of communism, Marxism-Leninism, or whatever one chooses to call 
those who approve totalitarianism that goes against the rights of man. Even if this 
campaign against me continues, I will not change my thoughts or principles of 
freedom. I will continue to struggle for the respect of these principles for all my 
Salvadoran brethren, for whom I have always struggled and for whom I will 
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continue to struggle despite all this slander that the people know is unjust. 
(“D’Aubuisson Explains”) 
 
In alienating the left, D’Aubuisson made his position well-known. He posed a strict 
choice for the Salvadoran people: freedom or oppression.  
D’Aubuisson clearly drew a distinct line between anything even tangentially 
associated with communism. Not unlike much of the global ideological discourse of the 
time, his message explained that there was no middle ground to be had. Any concession 
to the left was, for him, sympathy for the communist cause. In a 1980 public appearance 
1980, D’Aubuisson reportedly said that James Cheek, a U.S. envoy in charge of the 
embassy at the time, would “get what he deserves” for “leading El Salvador to 
Communism” while drawing his finger across his throat (Bonner). And in a 1983 
interview with German reporters, he was quoted as saying to the reporters “You 
Germans had the right idea, killing Jews to stop the spread of Communism” (Bonner). 
There was a deep-rooted, purely negative sentiment of Communism that motivated 
D’Aubuisson to do everything in his power to suppress its influence in El Salvador. His 
rhetoric expressed to the people that Communism must be curbed at any cost, and no 
life mattered if it was devoted to communist ideals.  He stated the following on the 
presence of communism in El Salvador:  
The developments in Berlin, Cinquera, Tananacingo, and many other villages, 
clearly show that we are facing an implacable and dehumanized enemy, who cares 
nothing about the Salvadoran people’s suffering because its sole objective is to 
seize power and to destroy our republican institutions. Only the bravery and 
heroism of our armed forces…has kept these subversive groups directed and 
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supported by international communism from taking over our homeland and 
turning it into a satellite of the Soviet Union. (“D’Aubuisson Comments on 
Elections, Economics”) 
 
Though D’Aubuisson’s hatred for leftist ideology was certainly no secret, the fear he 
created in the Salvadoran people somewhat masked the aggression of his outlook. El 
Salvador was at grave risk seeing the expansion of communism, a true matter of life and 
death. 
 
Turning to El Salvador’s Left 
While attacking communism as an ideology, D’Aubuisson consistently persecuted 
the members of El Salvador’s left: members of the PDC, FMLN, and other leftist 
revolutionary groups. He was trying to create distrust among El Salvador’s citizens in 
their government. They were at risk of being under full-fledged communist control. He 
claimed that the FMLN and PDC wanted to establish “a totalitarian ideology” that was 
“based on the Marxist-Leninist system” (“D’Aubuisson Comments on Elections, Junta”). 
In 1987, D’Aubuisson pushed to form a commission of doctors to assess the mental 
health of El Salvador’s president, PDC member José Napoleón Duarte. When asked why, 
D’Aubuisson claimed that “[Duarte] comes up with so many absurdities, such as 
offending and attacking [him]…the Constitution states that to relieve a president of his 
duties the Assembly must create a commission, and if they declare he is slightly off his 
rocker, well…let him throw in the towel!” (“D’Aubuisson, Ochoa Comment on Charges”). 
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Furthermore, he accused leftist groups of working to destroy the basis of the Salvadoran 
state. In 1984 he claimed that “the subversives are destroying [El Salvador’s] economy 
and infrastructure every day” and that the FMLN was “destroying the entire democratic 
process that [El Salvador] has achieved” (“D’Aubuisson on Return to Public Life”).  
D’Aubuisson frequently attacked the Church along with the left. Priests at the 
time often denounced the actions of the National Guard and right-wing groups. A 
common enemy of the Salvadoran right, Jesuits and the Catholic clergy were frequently 
scolded for their “interference” in the nation’s politics (“D’Aubuisson Defines”). “Keep the 
church out of state decisions” D’Aubuisson said. (Aldana). He reiterated this opinion 
regularly, explaining that “man should choose his own destiny with the good example of 
his parents and not by teachings of the political clergy” (“D’Aubuisson Defines”). He 
commented on the negative impact of the clergy having any participation in the political 
realm, going so far as to criticize Jesuits for promoting the idea of class struggles, as did 
communists (Aldana). According to D’Aubuisson, Jesuits were “promoters of political 
movements whose aim [was] to destroy the military forces and replace them with 
people’s militias,” as had happened in Nicaragua and Cuba where “lies and deceit 
prevailed” (“D’Aubuisson Defines”). D’Aubuisson’s vendetta against the priests of El 
Salvador had existed since the late 1970s, when the White Warriors Union, of which he 
was the founder, frequently wrote graffiti saying, “Be a Patriot, Kill a Priest” (McKinney). 
To promote the assassination of priests, D’Aubuisson would say that “once the dog is 
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dead, [they] won’t have to worry about rabies” to death squad members (McKinney). A 
declassified conversation also revealed that D’Aubuisson “bragged” about planning 
Archbishop Romero’s murder and referred to a lottery between death squad members 
in which the “winners” would be chosen to assassinate Romero (McKinney).  
 D’Aubuisson denied all accusations that exposed his violent hatred and 
willingness to order killings in the name of subduing communism. Despite suspect 
events such as the disappearances or killings of those who spoke out against him, he 
addressed such claims in his lifetime as simply defamation (Bonner). He tied it all back to 
the Salvadoran left, which was never to be trusted in their assessments. When both U.S. 
and Salvadoran officials called him a “psychopath” and “pathological killer”, he simply 
responded with claims that they were “crazy” and “liars” (“D’Aubuisson Once Called”). 
D’Aubuisson twisted negative sentiments against him and accused his opposition of 
defamation. He wanted to create an environment in which, even if a crime was proven, 
he was only the victim of malevolence by El Salvador’s left.    
 
Utilizing Democracy  
By the time D’Aubuisson attempted his coups in early 1980, the Salvadoran 
political state had been in turmoil for decades. Parties and coalitions constantly shifted 
power back and forth. When D’Aubuisson couldn’t achieve a coup to overtake the PDC’s 
centrist government, it was clear that the party would need to be combatted directly in 
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the political realm, where only the weakened PCN represented the right. The broken 
political environment allowed D’Aubuisson to create his own political party, the 
Nationalist Republic Alliance (ARENA), during a clandestine meeting with Guatemalan 
right-wing extremists (“Arena Celebrates”).  
Comprised of former PCN members and far-right military members, ARENA 
established a group committed to a conservative regime and ready to combat any leftist 
influence. Even the party’s name was to represent anti-communist sentiment, because 
“when a person says he is nationalist and republican, he cannot be sympathetic to 
communism” (“D’AUBUISSON ON PAST”). D’Aubuisson had created a political group 
with a clear vision for government, shown even in its name. It was to be a group that 
represented not only a person’s political beliefs, but their moral beliefs as well. 
D’Aubuisson explained that the party would “fight for constitutional government, fight 
for elections, fight to give the people an opportunity to express themselves and to 
support the army in maintaining tranquility and security” (“D’AUBUISSON ON PAST”). “Is 
it true that the people of El Salvador want a Marxist government, or do they want to live 
in peace, enjoying progress and order; in other words, under the free system of the 
west?” he asked in an interview (“D’AUBUISSON ON PAST”). For D’Aubuisson, aligning 
with ARENA was more than simply joining the right: it was being actively against the left.  
D’Aubuisson consistently focused on the democratic structure of El Salvador’s 
government. He felt the legal processes of the government were the key to seeing the 
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end of the turmoil. He claimed that the country had to “hold elections in order to 
establish a legal government, because the current regime [was making] laws at 
whim…and the leftists [were hiding] in a certain political party to try to seize power” 
(“D’Aubuisson Comments on Elections, Economics”). Only the will of the Salvadoran 
people could combat the corruption that existed among the left. D’Aubuisson never 
acknowledged any semblance of deceit from the right. Despite citizens suffering the 
most from the parties’ ideologic battle, the focus on elections made it seem as though 
they held all the power to stop what was happening in El Salvador. This shift of power 
was a key facet of D’Aubuisson’s manipulation, and ARENA soon gained a great 
following in the country. By the end of the decade, ARENA attained the expansive 
control D’Aubuisson desired while never straying from its central message: communism, 
and anything associated with it, did not belong in El Salvador’s government.  
ARENA’s creation in late 1981 came at a pivotal time in El Salvador. The country 
was about to hold its first elections in 2 years within months of the party’s creation to 
select its provisional government and elect Constituent Assembly seats. D’Aubuisson 
established his presence in El Salvador as a powerful leader in the months that followed. 
He argued that only he and ARENA could create the kind of reform that was needed. 
D’Aubuisson told Salvadoran citizens that “[he and his party] were not against change, 
but against the way it is being carried out,” promising that support for his party was also 
support for the “glorious armed forces [who are] fighting terrorism and international 
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communism” (“D’Aubuisson Defines”). Through ARENA, D’Aubuisson had created a 
direct path for himself in the political and societal spheres. He was the face of the 
newest, largest right-wing party in the nation. He was no longer simply a former army 
member or an extremist adversary to the government—he was now a part of the 
government process. D’Aubuisson attained through ARENA a legal, democratic path for 
the far-right to state leadership, and he could now be a respected political 
representative.  
El Salvador’s 1982 elections were at the forefront of both national and 
international news in the western hemisphere. They would decide which party could 
name the provisional president and create El Salvador’s reformist government, 
effectively deciding whether the right or the left would hold power as the war between 
the two ensued.  The CIA and Regan administration were already committed to seeing 
the PDC hold power over the Salvadoran government through propaganda and financial 
support (LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard 158). But at events, D’Aubuisson always made 
an impression on the public. His new platform as an ARENA representative for dialogue 
bred the start of many signature chants and actions, which he continued throughout the 
war at his gatherings. For instance, after leading the ARENA’s campaign song “Tremble, 
Tremble, Communists” (Gruson), D’Aubuisson would hold up a watermelon, slash it with 
a machete, and claim that was the PDC: green, or democratic, on the outside, but red, or 
communist, on the inside (Bonner). D’Aubuisson ensured he propagated his anti-left 
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message in distinct ways, and it worked well for the party upon election day. The results 
gave the majority to the PDC with 40.1%, but this prompted the Salvadoran right 
(comprised of the PCN and ARENA) to create a coalition to gain the majority with a 
combined vote of 48.7% (29.53% for ARENA and 19.17% for PCN) (Montgomery 161). 
But with U.S. support behind the PDC, and the national military relying on U.S. aid, the 
right was unable to gain control of El Salvador’s presidency. However, the parties did 
attain the majority of Constituent Assembly seats and subsequently named D’Aubuisson 
as its president. From this position, he had a firm to launch an eventual campaign for El 
Salvador’s presidency.  
While part of the Constituent Assembly, D’Aubuisson worked helped to draft a 
new Salvadoran constitution, which is still in use in the country to this day, and he and 
ARENA continued to gain support among the public. When the Assembly put in a 
motion to curtail his power, D’Aubuisson resigned and claimed that he and other right-
wing members would “reorganize the leadership, when the assembly becomes a 
legislative assembly” (Beltran). He was demonstrating that the government’s legal 
processes were not being followed. The statement made through his resignation was to 
perpetuate further doubts in the public of whether the left could truly be trusted to run 
it. Then, despite his claim that he would not run for president in the 1984 presidential 
elections, ARENA announced that he would be their candidate.  
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Upon his candidacy, D’Aubuisson called on the Salvadoran people to unite 
against communism. “Salvadorans,” he stated, “let us always remember that the interest 
of the entire Salvadoran people must come before individual or group interests…at 
these decisive moments, we cannot betray our homeland—we must unite in order to 
save it” (“D’Aubuisson Comments on Elections, Economics”). Once again shifting the 
power to the people, D’Aubuisson called on the citizens who surely wanted peace to 
come together to enact the change they desired. If they wanted prosperity, he and 
ARENA had to be in office. He was trying to show that the people would only be fairly 
represented through him. The following quote from his 1984 election speech further 
expands on this belief and demonstrates the leverage of control that he gave to 
Salvadorans: 
The fundamental platform of our party is to attain peace, but we want to be very 
clear about this because we are not trying to deceive anyone. We believe that we 
will attain peace when El Salvador and our people obtain a victory. It is not true 
that we will continue negotiations to share with those gentlemen a power to which 
they have no right. Power emanates only from the vote, from you, from the people. 
If you wish to join and if you like our platform, welcome to our party and vote for 
the nationalists! As we always like to state in concluding our messages, I say: Above 
all the things about which we have spoken to you so much, we say and we will 
continue saying that El Salvador comes first, second, and third. (“D’Aubuisson Hits 
Corruption”) 
 
D’Aubuisson chose his words carefully, and while rhetoric such as this is not 
uncharacteristic of a candidate running for office, it is ironic because he spent much of 
his time denouncing the left and its supporters yet called for unity among the whole 
country. D’Aubuisson could not fathom compromising with or uniting with the left in 
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any matter, yet he expected the people of El Salvador to do so to put him into office. His 
speeches were calculated and expressed a sentiment of care for all of El Salvador, saying 
the people as a whole should be represented. In reality, he was only speaking to people 
would join in suppressing the voices of those who did not agree. Many followed his 
promise of peace and voted for his presidency, maybe not realizing that his “peace” that 
could only be realized in a society of uniform, right-wing beliefs, which was not only 
impossible, but simply not peace at all.  
D’Aubuisson did not win the presidential election and accusations of cheating 
came from both sides. After Senator Jesse Helms’ admission that the CIA delivered 
money to directly to the Christian Democrats, D’Aubuisson claimed that the election was 
indeed fraudulent (“A Little Help from Friends”). He believed he “won the elections; but 
the CIA came, interfered, and made Duarte president” and that his “political rights had 
certainly been violated” (Stackl). However, the Elections Commission deemed the 
election legal, and Duarte was officially pronounced as El Salvador’s president. However, 
claims of ARENA having committed fraud were found to be true as representatives of 
the party were proven to have told uneducated campesinos to vote for D’Aubuisson 
right before entering polls and also handed multiple ballots to every ARENA supporter 
in various locations (Montgomery 181).  D’Aubuisson gaining 46% of the vote to 
Duarte’s 53%, and while the percentage of fraudulent votes on either side could not be 
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calculated, the vote for ARENA was certainly telling of the widespread support that 
D’Aubuisson had gained in the country. 
Despite his loss, D’Aubuisson was still successful in expanding ARENA’s following. 
ARENA candidate Alfredo Cristiani would win the presidency in 1989, and ARENA would 
hold power for two decades after. Through ARENA, D’Aubuisson built a network of 
followers who could help carry out his mission to subdue the power of the left in El 
Salvador. As D’Aubuisson stated in a 1989 interview, ARENA’s purpose was essential 
when “a monster was born in Nicaragua (the Sandinista government), and the birth of a 
similar monster was expected in El Salvador…the ARENA party prevented this by winning 
elections in 1982” (Stackl). ARENA aimed to be a saving grace in El Salvador. It was the 
mechanism through which the Salvadoran people could supposedly be represented and 
avoid the destructive consequences of having a leftist government. In reality, however, 
ARENA was simply a greater platform for D’Aubuisson’s own idea of government and 
his personal mechanism to create a coalition of people who could carry out his political 
goals. Through ARENA, D’Aubuisson ensured that his views were represented even 
when he was no longer part of the government himself. It was an idea primarily 
attainable due to the unstable political environment that El Salvador had suffered 
through for decades. D’Aubuisson’s steadfast beliefs and ability to bring the right 
together allowed for the rise of one of the most prevalent and long-lasting parties in the 
country’s history. 
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Charisma, Fear, and Extremism  
A biographical pamphlet by journalist Malena Recinos, she described 
D’Aubuisson as “an extraordinary citizen” whose charisma “infected men and women, 
and everywhere he went, crowds poured out and cheered him on like a movie star” 
(Sprenkels). He was described as a lean and handsome man, shorter than most at five-
foot-six, who wore skin-tight T-shirts at campaign rallies and signed autographs for 
“adoring female followers” (“Personality Spotlight”). Even President Reagan’s 
ambassador to El Salvador, Deane R. Hinton, once joked that he “ran a risk” when he 
introduced his then-30-year-old girlfriend to D’Aubuisson, at her request (Bonner). 
Upon his death in 1992, thousands of mourners filled the streets of El Salvador to 
commemorate his life, wearing shirts that read “I Love D’Aubuisson” and chanting one 
of his signature campaign slogans, “Fatherland yes, communism no” (Aleman).  
The leader mesmerized his followers with his “caricature of kinetic energy” and 
impassioned rhetoric (Bonner). It wasn’t hard for many to truly believe what he was 
saying, and that he wanted nothing more than peace for El Salvador. An associate of 
D’Aubuisson’s, David Ernesto Panamá, who assisted in death squad operations (Political 
Situation), described how “the personality of D’Aubuisson gained the affection and 
esteem of the people” (Sprenkels 22). Panamá emphasized D’Aubuisson’s “jovial 
character” and “ability to work without bounds or fatigue” (Sprenkels 22). “He was a man 
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that loved freedom” Panamá said, “always willing to sacrifice his life for his people” 
(Sprenkels 22). However, for those who didn’t agree with his message, it was well-known 
that disagreement should be kept secret. “Everyone is scared of D’Aubuisson” an 
anonymous observer in a New York Times article said. “You should be asking not what 
he does during the day but what he does at night” (Chavez). Many of the Salvadorans 
who spoke negatively about D’Aubuisson during this time insisted on remaining 
anonymous. This was largely due to the fact that those who D’Aubuisson would call out 
typically ended up murdered. In televised shows paid for by wealthy Salvadoran exiles, 
he used intelligence files taken from ANSESAL to denounce alleged traitors and 
Communists, many of whom were killed by death squads. One of whom was Archbishop 
Romero, whom D’Aubuisson had targeted only weeks before his assassination after 
Romero publicly denounced D’Aubuisson as a “liar, torturer, and murderer” General 
Medrano, D’Aubuisson’s mentor, simply stated that “D’Aubuisson was pointing out the 
Communists so the troops could kill them” (Nairn).  
For those who knew D’Aubuisson personally, his purely extremist nature was 
evident. Manuel Noriega, the de facto right-wing dictator of Panama from 1983 to 1989, 
had met D’Aubuisson on various occasions. In his autobiography, Noriega described 
D’Aubuisson as “so radically anti-communist, so extreme on his hatred of anyone even 
suspected of being on the left and so open about it that he was expelled from [the 
Salvadoran army] for the sake of appearance” (Noriega). D’Aubuisson was a man of 
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hardline views, with no room for understanding any facet of the other side. When 
D’Aubuisson responded “está jodido, pues—that’s f*cked up” to Noriega’s statement 
that everybody, even communists, were “free to come and go in Panama” (Noriega), 
Noriega went on to describe D’Aubuisson’s nature in the following way:  
The subject illuminated the personality of the man; his prosecution of war was like 
a psychosis. And his attitude also foreshadowed what he was really doing…while 
D’Aubuisson never said so directly, he talked about “hitting the Marxists from all 
directions,” saying, “The communists are like vermin…they must be exterminated,” 
and if necessary, he would do so in a “scorched earth” campaign. These were the 
very words he used. And when he spoke, his eyes glistened with the ardor of what 
he was saying. (Noriega 73) 
 
In a New York Times article, associates of D’Aubuisson described his staunch, aggressive 
presence. They described his handsome features as appearing so tense that one 
observer described him as “having clenched hair” who preferred one-on-one 
communication with officials. According to the article, the observer explained that 
D’Aubuisson “will sit around a big table listening and then call someone over to the side 
to meet with him later, then he really talks…he has the uncanny ability to manipulate 
other people, or to make you uneasy while you are asking questions” (66). Colonel 
Roberto Eulalio Santiváñez, D’Aubuisson’s superior at ANSESAL, remembered 
D’Aubuisson as “an anarchic psychopath” (Kinzer, “EX-AIDE”).  
Although D’Aubuisson was not the first, and certainly not the last, leader to 
express such sinister views, even prominent dictators in the time noted how aggressive 
and extreme his views were. His rhetoric only made it that much more likely that he was 
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guilty of all the crimes he was accused of at the time; however, it also granted him the 
opportunity to take advantage of a society that was searching for a way out of social 
and political destruction. His fervent beliefs gave a clear enemy to a country searching 
for peace and made many too afraid to speak out against him.  
 
A Deadly Combination 
 D’Aubuisson had a powerful influence in El Salvador. He utilized various avenues 
to spread his beliefs and alienate the opposition, largely taking advantage of the 
democratic processes in the country. While many were fearful of him, many were true 
supporters. He frequently used positive rhetoric to frame his aggressive ideals—being 
part of ARENA was “patriotic,” and he was not an extremist but simply a nationalist. He 
characterized himself as a man for the people who only wanted to save El Salvador from 
chaos and destruction. However, he was a man for only a select group: those in favor of 
the right-wing, and anyone else had to be suppressed. Many who may have wanted to 
speak out against him worried for their lives and the lives of their families. But his 
charisma, physical attributes, and impassioned dialogue convinced a large portion 
Salvadorans that he truly was the leader the country needed. His mass manipulation, 
with the help of other circumstances and associations during this time, made Roberto 
D’Aubuisson one of the most powerful leaders El Salvador had ever seen.  
 







2. Alliance with the Wealthy Elite in El Salvador 
 Roberto D’Aubuisson was no stranger to the Salvadoran social and political 
hierarchies. Despite having grown up in the middle class, he grew to join El Salvador’s 
elite that was comprised of top military officials and wealthy oligarchs. The oligarchy 
had long been aligned with El Salvador’s military to form the country’s right wing, and 
the coalition enjoyed decades of government control. However, upon the coup in 1979 
that gave way to a center-left junta, it was clear the historical power the oligarchy had 
enjoyed could no longer be enforced by the military. The junta enacted agrarian reform 
policies that severely cut the ownership of landowners by expropriating landholdings 
that were over 500 hectares, with compensation. Phase I of the three phase process 
allowed owners to “reserve” or keep 100 to 150 hectares depending upon the quality of 
land (Haggerty). Massive agrarian reform was seen as necessary as more than 70% of 
the nation’s land was owned by less than 1% of the population (Gruson). The 
government was to redistribute the land and turn it into cooperatives run by laborers. 
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This phase affected 15% of El Salvador’s land, and saw some positive results. British 
report Jon Snow visited one of the cooperatives, noting the following: 
La Llavora, a farm of 300 acres it produces coffee, rice and sugar. But although the 
owner, a 75-year-old millionaire still lives in the heart of the farm, it now belongs 
to its workers. The junta recognized that if poverty was to be undermined here, the 
land upon which they worked would have to be redistributed to spread the wealth 
more evenly. (Snow) 
 
While Snow reported positive outcomes from the new system, particularly in terms of 
education and income for the hundreds of families that lived there, this was only a select 
example of the reform process working efficiently. Most of the cooperatives ended up 
operating the same way they had prior to the reforms, without any of the benefits that 
La Llavora saw. Additionally, only about a fourth of the rural poor received claims to the 
land, much of which was “no good” or was too little of a portion to feed even one family 
(Snow). A 1986 study found that 95% of the cooperatives were unable to pay even 
interest on the debt that they were forced to take on in order to pay back the 
landowners; in total, cooperatives owed over $800 million (Snow).   
Despite the little benefit of the agrarian reform on the rural left, the junta 
continued to take steps to appease the left. It nationalized the country’s banking system 
and took control of the agricultural export market to ensure beneficiaries had credit. 
Rural areas that were supposed to benefit from the reform saw increased levels of 
violence from guerillas, forcing many landowners to flee if they would not give up their 
holdings (Kinzer, “The Hunger”). This created resentment amongst the oligarchs of El 
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Salvador, and a need to find a way back into control over the government and their 
wealth. D’Aubuisson provided the perfect opportunity for this: conservative ARENA was 
already making headway in the political realm shortly after its creation in 1981, and his 
role as the death squad leader gave oligarchs a way to indirectly subdue the forces that 
had forced them from their holdings. The CIA had already reported that “millions of 
dollars” were sent to D’Aubuisson in 1981 to support a right-wing coup, and that his 
following was comprised largely of the Salvadoran elite (El Salvador: The Role of 
Roberto D’Aubuisson). As his political prominence grew, so did his wealthy following.   
 D’Aubuisson’s alliance with the elite was not unknown to civilians. One poor 
Salvadoran who had voted for Duarte in the 1984 elections agreed that ARENA was the 
party of the rich but figured candidates would not have to steal because of it. “Maybe 
they’ll steal a little,” she told a reporter, “but won’t fill their pockets without extending a 
hand to the poor” (Miller). With severe economic downturn due to the significant 
decreases in agricultural exports she felt she had no choice but to go against the 
candidate, Duarte, and the U.S.-backed government who had fallen through with their 
promises. Amid a disastrous economy fueled by the left, D’Aubuisson and ARENA were 
even able to utilize elitist ties to gain support amongst the lower classes. 
  
Death Squad and ARENA Funding  
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In 1981, approximately 150-300 oligarch families resided in Miami (Hornblower). 
Many of these Salvadorans supported conservative U.S. politics, traveling to the country 
for Ronald Reagan’s inauguration and supporting his ascension into U.S. executive 
power. One oligarch explained that he “believes in free enterprise, just like Reagan 
talked about in his campaign,” expressing his “great hopes that Reagan will correct the 
huge errors” of the Carter administration and not let El Salvador “fall into the hands of 
international communism” (Hornblower). Another oligarch expressed the same 
sentiments, and though denying any association or funding for D’Aubuisson, was a co-
founder of the anticommunist Broad National Front and accompanied D’Aubuisson to 
Washington in 1980, shortly before his visa was revoked (Hornblower).  
In a 1984 congressional testimony, former ambassador Robert White claimed that 
six wealthy Salvadoran landowners financed D’Aubuisson and his death squad 
operations, based on a trusted source close to the six (Farah). These wealthy oligarchs 
became known as the “Miami Six” who were providing funding for D’Aubuisson’s death 
squads, and coordinating attacks, kidnappings, and assassinations through their 
Salvadoran connections in Miami (Brinkley). While only White’s testimony served as 
evidence of the existence of a specific six oligarchs, the 1993 United Nations Truth 
Commissions Report on El Salvador confirmed that the wealthy elites were in fact aiding 
the death squads. The report assessed the following:  
Former Major D’Aubuisson drew considerable support from wealthy civilians who 
feared that their interests would be affected by the reform programme announced 
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by the Government Junta. They were convinced that the country faced a serious 
threat of Marxist insurrection which they had to overcome. The Commission on the 
Truth obtained testimony from many sources that some of the richest landowners 
and businessmen outside and inside the country offered their estates, homes, 
vehicles, and bodyguards to help the death squads. They also provided funds used 
to organize and maintain the death squads, especially those directed by former 
Major D’Aubuisson. (13) 
 
The report also linked Hector Regalado, an oligarch closely associated with D’Aubuisson 
who even served as his Chief of Security during D’Aubuisson’s tenure as Assembly 
President, as coordinating D’Aubuisson’s network of death squads; at times, even from 
his office in the National Assembly (13). According to a CIA report on right-wing 
terrorism in El Salvador, Regalado had been associated with D’Aubuisson since the 
1970’s, directing ARENA’s death squads who engage in “assassination, kidnapping, 
torture, and political intimidation” (Briefing Paper). 
Another oligarch associated with D’Aubuisson was Francisco Guirola Beeche, a 
conservative businessman who travelled frequently to the U.S. and was known as a 
financial backer of d’Aubiusson. In 1985, Guirola was arrested along with 2 other men at 
a Texas airfield as their private jet was being refueled. In the jet were nine suitcases 
containing more than $5.9 million, and PDC members claimed this money was to be 
used by ARENA to “corrupt the electoral process” (Omang). The Guirola family had been 
historically against Duarte after the PDC-backed junta nationalized the bank, the Banco 
Salvadoreno, which the family owned. Guirola had even let D’Aubuisson use his office in 
San Salvador as an ARENA headquarters (Omang). The pilot, Gus Maestrales, lived in 
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Florida and was also “known as a possible contraband exporter” (Omang). Guirola also 
had allegations related to cocaine smuggling, money laundering, and associations with 
the Argentine secret police, yet after his arrest the U.S. government “dropped most of 
the charges against him…supposedly to avoid jeopardizing his future changes of 
emigrating to the U.S.” (Scott 48). 
 The wealthy elite also heavily funded D’Aubuisson’s political party, ARENA. 
During elections, the heads of sugar, coffee, and other agricultural associations hosted 
fundraising events in support for D’Aubuisson’s campaigns (McCartney). Among over 
750 of El Salvador’s wealthiest, D’Aubuisson said he felt “practically amid family,” 
pledging to put these “men of the countryside” in charge of the government ministries 
and agencies that run the economy (McCartney). The president of the coffee association 
expressed that “deputies of ARENA, D’Aubuisson’s party, are our deputies” (McCartney). 
The association allowed ARENA to raise significantly more campaign money than 
opponents, totaling over $1 million (Montgomery 134).  
 Pushing conservative economic policy, such as re-privatizing the national bank 
and reversing some agrarian reform, D’Aubuisson made great allies with El Salvador’s 
wealthiest. This was key in expanding his influence, not only through ARENA but 
through death squad operations as well. The downturn in the economy made his 
associations appealing to even some of the lower class, who wanted to see economic 
 47  
growth that D’Aubuisson promised to provide. The disparity between classes ultimately 










3. U.S. Complacency Towards the Salvadoran Right 
 
 Roberto D’Aubuisson’s exercise of power was not unknown among much of El 
Salvador, nor the United States. An essential facet of D’Aubuisson’s prominence was the 
fact that the U.S., despite having knowledge of his wrongdoings, did not make much 
effort to stop him. They continued to fund El Salvador’s military, who had connections 
with D’Aubuisson’s death squads, and, while never expressing outright support, never 
directly denounced him either. U.S. foreign policy and aid to El Salvador remained 
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focused on stopping leftist guerillas, even if it meant allowing D’Aubuisson to continue 
his own clandestine operations. 
 
The Beginning: Carter and El Salvador 
 By the start of El Salvador’s conflict in late 1979, President Carter had already 
claimed his commitment to human rights and deemed their fulfillment a central factor in 
determining the amount of aid granted to a country. Given the abuses that had been 
occurring in El Salvador under its autocratic regimes, Carter decided to stop all military 
aid and cut economic aid by half in 1977 (LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard 38). However, 
upon the usurpation of President Romero in 1979 and the creation of a junta pursuing 
reconciliation between conservatives and the far left, the Carter administration 
subsequently reinstated military aid to El Salvador. It pressured the Christian Democrats 
to join in governance and form a new junta, which would be achieved in January 1980, 
that would not allow the far left to have any sort of political voice (Bonner). Carter’s 
appointment for El Salvador’s new ambassador in early 1980, Robert White, explained 
the strategy well by saying that “what Latin America desperately needed [was] a non-
Communist model for revolution” (LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard 140). With the 
upcoming U.S. presidential election and Reagan’s call for a stricter presence in Central 
America, Carter prioritized repression of the left over ensuring the realization of human 
rights in the country.   
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 The new junta with the official presence of the PDC still pursued agrarian and 
banking reform, but it ultimately catered to the U.S.’s desire to curb leftist influence. The 
mutability of the junta’s policies laid the groundwork for D’Aubuisson’s rise to political 
prominence, as both sides of El Salvador felt unheard. The right was alienated in reform 
and leftist revolutionaries were still suppressed, and this caused the government’s 
influence to wane. In a U.S. Department of State cable in September 1980 from El 
Salvador’s embassy, the PDC was described as “a party in search of a constituency” 
(Political Situation). Prominent Christian Democrat José Duarte even conceded that the 
PDC “had been practically eliminated as a grassroots organization” and the junta was 
virtually without popular support (Duarte 179. However, though the administration 
wanted to curb a leftist uprising, it also actively worked to prevent a rightist coup as 
well. Neither extreme of El Salvador could be given power, so the objectives of Robert 
White and the U.S. embassy focused on four things: 1) pushing the junta to implement 
social reforms, thereby building legitimacy for itself and undercutting the left’s popular 
support; 2) reducing violence by the security forces by urging the government to take 
military control away from the right; 3) protect the junta from a right-wing coup; and 4) 
isolate the radical left by encouraging the moderate left to abandon alliances with 
guerillas (LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard 43). 
Taking control of the armed forces away from the right would prove to be the 
hardest and most important goal. One U.S. official stated that “what [the U.S.] has to do 
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is wean the military off the teat of the oligarchy and onto [theirs]” (Dickey, “Oligarch 
Takes Stand”) which was difficult given the long-standing history of military and 
oligarchy alignment. Shortly before Ambassador’s White’s appointment, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State James Cheek was sent to fill in the role at El Salvador’s 
embassy. Upon learning of an imminent right-wing coup in February, Cheek threatened 
to cut off aid if the military participated in the coup, but also promised to grant new aid 
if they stayed loyal to the junta (“Rightist Coup Imminent”). When the coup failed, Cheek 
ensured the U.S. kept its promise. After returning to Washington, he urged the 
administration to deploy military advisory teams and send the Salvadoran army six 
helicopters to maintain U.S. credibility. Cheek argued that this would ensure a “clean 
counter-insurgency war” (Riding). Despite Ambassador White’s ardent opposition, the 
U.S. followed through on Cheek’s promise. In October 1980, army logistics teams were 
sent to survey the military’s weapon needs, despite the administration’s declaration that 
only non-lethal aid would be given. Military training teams were sent along with a five-
man team instructed to help Salvadorans organize counterinsurgency operations to 
defend against possible guerilla attacks on the upcoming coffee harvest (LeoGrande, 
Our Own Backyard 45). The six helicopters were also approved at no-cost to El Salvador, 
so long as the military instilled human rights reforms and eliminated influence of the 
extreme right via the transfer of officers implicated in death squads. The military did 
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neither—they simply created a new code for military conduct and the helicopters were 
approved (“JRG Provides Written Response”).  
U.S. foreign policy towards El Salvador under Carter could not stop the decade-
long conflict that would unfold in El Salvador. The military proved unwilling to meet the 
demands of the junta, prompting frustration among governing members and their 
eventual resignation. El Salvador’s political sphere grew even more polarized. “We have 
not been able to stop the repression” said junta member Héctor Dada, “and those 
committing acts of repression…go unpunished” (Arnson 19). Former members of the 
PDC split to form a separate Christian Democratic party, weakening the PDC’s power, 
and the centrism of the junta began to tilt to the right. Progressive military officers were 
stripped of their command, and their leader, Colonel Majano, was removed from the 
junta in November 1980 after a failed assassination attempt (LeoGrande, Our Own 
Backyard 47). During this time the left unified as well. The 5 major guerillas groups 
combined to form la Frente Farbundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN), named 
for the Communist leader who led the peasant uprising that led to La Mantanza in 1932. 
They joined the leftist political group Frente Democrático Revolucionario (FDR) to create 
a coalition uniting the left in the exact way the U.S. had been working to prevent.  
Roberto D’Aubuisson took great advantage of the decline in popular support for 
the PDC and the junta’s subsequent failure, utilizing the instability of the government in 
1980 and 1981 to build a network that could “save El Salvador from Communism” (9 p. 
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50). A former aide of his described how D’Aubuisson and his supporters set out to build 
a structured organization with 3 tiers: “a political or propaganda level…to encourage and 
protect the military level;…a financial system where we would always have the money to 
attack; and a military level—what the United States called right-wing death squads—
people who go out and kidnap and kill communists” (Pyes). With the wealthy oligarchs 
both in El Salvador and in exile helping to fund D’Aubuisson, and support among the 
military, the extreme right began to take formative shape. In 1980, over 8 thousand 
people were killed, the majority either by the security forces or death squads, and no 
arrests were made. Despite the supposed alliance between the PDC and the military, 
many of the victims were PDC leaders (Duarte 108). The moderate factions of El Salvador 
were systematically being removed from prominence. The junta’s failure to gain 
substantial support resulted in an extremist tug of war between El Salvador’s left and 
right as both gained a greater following. When Reagan took office in 1981, he would 
make clear the U.S.’s position on the matter in the years that followed.  
 
Enter Reagan: “Rollback” and El Salvador’s Right 
Since the Truman Administration, U.S. presidents made had the clear mission of 
stopping the expansion of communism via “Containment,” in which they focused solely 
on stopping communist influence from going any further than it already had, or 
“containing” it to the regions in which it was already pervasive. It was clear, however, 
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that although U.S. foreign policy goals centered around keeping communism at bay, 
citizens in numerous countries continued to band together to support leftist revolutions. 
This indicated somewhat of a failure in the eyes of the global stage—by the 1970s, 
countries throughout Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia had clear ideologic 
battles brewing.  
The continuous rise in global conflict prompted Reagan to create a new vision for 
Cold War efforts during the 1980 campaign: communist, and therefore Soviet, influence 
must not only be stopped in its tracks, but it must be reversed in the areas where it had 
already taken hold. This was a policy he enacted called “rollback,” in which the goal was 
not to stop leftist revolutions from starting other countries, but to push against the ones 
that had already taken shape as a way to display to the rest of the world that these 
movements would not be tolerated. Though certainly not everyone would agree with 
Reagan, the notion that “radical left” ideals could be pushed back was enticing as the 
presidential campaign fell during a peak time of severe Latin American conflict. Reagan 
made “rollback” the crux of his foreign policy promises as he criticized Carter’s handling 
of the proxy wars, stating in his campaign that “in four years, Mr. Carter’s administration 
has managed to alienate our friends in the Hemisphere, to encourage the destabilization 
of governments, and to permit Cuban and Soviet influence to grow” (78).   
In order to achieve the goal of “rollback,” Reagan focused his foreign policy 
efforts on providing overt support for anti-Communist insurgents and any groups 
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actively fighting against the spread of communism in their home countries. This was 
known as the Reagan Doctrine, the term used to characterize this aspect of the 
administration’s foreign policy. “We must stand by all our democratic allies,” Reagan 
said in his 1985 State of the Union address, “and we must not break faith with those 
who are risking their lives to defy Soviet-supported aggression…support for freedom 
fighters is self-defense” (“The ‘Reagan Doctrine’ is Announced”). In the context of El 
Salvador, Reagan’s policy manifested through support for the right-wing and any 
moderate groups not aligned with leftist guerillas.  
When Reagan took office in January 1981, the U.S. was well aware of the 
atrocities occurring in El Salvador, even those against U.S. citizens. In fact, four U.S. nuns 
were gruesomely murdered just a month before his inauguration. The churchwomen 
had just arrived in El Salvador and were driving back from the airport when they were 
kidnapped, raped, then shot to death. Their bodies were left stabbed in a shallow grave 
for peasants to find the next day. In response, Carter suspended military aid to the 
country. The U.S. Embassy then presented evidence incriminating five guardsmen to the 
Salvadoran government in April 1981, but no charges were made until February of 1982, 
when one guardsman gave a full confession (“Rural Population”). Later that month, 
President Reagan invoked his presidential emergency powers to reinstate $55 million in 
military aid to El Salvador’s government (LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard 54). A live 
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report from British reporter Jon Snow in 1981 highlights Reagan’s focus on aiding the 
military:  
President Reagan has charged that [the guerillas] are being supplied with weapons 
by Russia and Cuba, and his administration explains that they have American 
weaponry by saying that it comes from old American stockpiles in Vietnam and 
Ethiopia. In reality, these weapons have been bought with money raised from 
kidnap ransoms, and most predate anything left in Vietnam. The Soviets certainly 
favor the left here, but how much tangible support they give is questionable. And 
behind America’s accusation of Russian involvement in armed supplies is a major 
embarrassment in their own supply policy. US military supplies to the junta’s army 
against whom these people are fighting were suspended after the brutal murder 
last December of 4 American nuns. The Salvadoran judge appointed to look into 
the case was killed himself on the day his report was due to come out. That report 
heavily implicated the military in those deaths. A brand-new Hughes helicopter, 
which we filmed secretly in the square of an army-held town called Guitarra, 
underlines Mr. Reagan’s decision to ignore the deaths of the nuns and resume 
supplies. More weapons are arriving daily for the very army units that were 
manning the roadblocks at which the sisters disappeared. Although the judges 
report was never published, reliable sources are adamant that he had evidence that 
Salvadoran army men raped and shot the nuns in cold blood. (Snow) 
 
The month he reinstated the aid, President Reagan had submitted his first 
certification report on the Salvadoran government’s progress on human rights, a 
Congressional requirement needed to allow U.S. military assistance (Presidential 
Certification). In the certification, the administration claimed the situation had improved 
based on statistics showing a decrease in killings between 1980 and 1981 (from 9,000 to 
5,331) (Presidential Certification). The report also made no reference to any government 
complicity in rights violations, directly denying the association between paramilitary 
death squads and government security forces. This claim was made after a U.S. embassy 
report was released claiming death squads were comprised of “both on and off-duty 
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security forces” who were responsible for “many hundreds, perhaps thousands,” of El 
Salvador’s political killings (Presidential Certification). The statistics used in the 
certification were also assembled by the embassy via Salvadoran press reports. An 
embassy official acknowledged, however, that the Salvadoran press was “inherently 
biased, not accurate, and not competent by U.S. standards” (El Salvador’s Decade of 
Terror). Other groups found the reports claims suspicious as well. According to three 
human rights groups (the Catholic Church’s Legal Aid Office, the Central American 
University’s Documentation Center, and the Salvadoran Human Rights Commission), the 
actual number of killings in 1981 was 2 to 3 times higher than the embassy’s reporting. 
While each group had slightly different calculations, the lowest of all 3 was 13,000, 
compared to the president’s claim of a little over 5000. El Salvador’s own Defense 
Minister, Gen. Jose Guillermo Garcia, reported that a total of 30,000 people had been 
killed since the October 1979 coup (Dinges).  
There were many claims by former U.S. officials that the Reagan administration 
largely ignored evidence presented against El Salvador’s government and the existence 
of death squads. Former Ambassador Robert White claimed that information regarding 
wealthy exiles funding the right from Miami, Archbishop Romero’s assassination, and 
details on death squads were reported to Washington but “the administration [had] 
suppressed these facts” (Brinkley). White claimed that he had testimony confirming 
D’Aubuisson as the organizer the assassination, a fact that would later prove to be true. 
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Less than a month after White’s testimony, Secretary of State George P. Shultz had lunch 
with D’Aubuisson during a visit to El Salvador, emphasizing that, no matter the outcome 
of the upcoming 1984 presidential election, the U.S. believed in “accepting the verdict, 
whatever it may be” (Brinkley). Another senior State Department official Elliot Abrams 
also presented testimony saying that it was “highly likely that Roberto D’Aubuisson was 
an active participant in and very possibly at the head of the meeting during which 
Archbishop Romero’s assassination was planned” (Bonner). His assessment was based 
on a source who had “demonstrated reliability”; yet, these cables were marked secret 
and no public condemnation of D’Aubuisson occurred, and he continued to operate 
freely in El Salvador (Bonner).   
As evidence of El Salvador’s military committing human rights abuses mounted 
for the administration, aid and CIA training did not cease. Even the origins of El 
Salvador’s death squad forces came from U.S. involvement. In an interview with 
journalist Allan Nairn, General Medrano, former Salvadoran intelligence leader, had this 
to say: 
ORDEN and ANSESAL grew out of the State Department, the CIA, and the Green 
Berets during the time of Kennedy. We created these specialized agencies to fight 
the plans and actions of international communism. We organized ORDEN, 
ANSESAL, and counterinsurgency courses, and we bought special arms—G3 
automatic rifles—to detain communist movement. We are preparing them to stop 
communism. (Nairn) 
 
CIA training of the military continued through covert and overt operations. A former 
member of El Salvador’s security forces gave testimony regarding the training 
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Salvadoran officers received from the U.S., which included training in “methods of 
physical and psychological torture” (31). An excerpt of his testimony highlights the 
methods that officers in El Salvador’s security forces used against prisoners:  
First, you try to torture him psychologically. If he’s a Marxist or 
revolutionary, it’s not easy to make him talk, so you have to psychologically 
harm the prisoner. If the person is important—say, a journalist or teacher or 
a laborer or student leader, or a person who has something to offer—he 
isn’t treated cruelly at first…You try to trap him psychologically. You try to 
come across as a sensitive, decent person—not as a killer…But after using 
these methods for a few days or a week or two, you start getting 
tough…After these sessions, the physical torture begins. First, you put the 
prisoner in a small, completely dark room, and you don’t let him sleep. You 
place him, naked and handcuffed, on a bed frame. The room stinks horribly 
because of the urine and excrement of former prisoners, and you keep him 
there for a week without sleep so that his nerves will be shot when you start 
to torture him. When the actual torture begins, there are a lot of different 
methods: cutting off pieces of the skin, burning him with cigarettes. They 
teach you how to hit a person in the stomach, but in a sophisticated way so 
the person suffers a lot of pain but you don’t see signs on the outside. Or 
sometimes you just beat him…beat him, and beat him, and beat him. After 
that, if he still doesn’t talk, you take him to a toilet filled with excrement. 
You put on gloves and shove his head into the toilet for thirty seconds or 
so. You do this over and over. Then you wash him and take him to the 
electric shock room. There’s a special torture room in the Treasury 
Police…it’s soundproof so they don’t hear anything outside. 
In general, you will kill the prisoners because there’s an assumption 
they shouldn’t live. If we pass them to the judge, they’ll go free and we’ll 
maybe have to pick them up again. If there’s a lot of pressure—like from 
Amnesty International—then we might pass them to a judge, but if there’s 
no pressure, then they’re dead. When it’s over, you just throw him in the 
alleys with a sign saying Mano Blanco or ESA (Secret Anticommunist 
Army)…These are the things that happen in war. (Nairn) 
 
One of the most prominent connections between the U.S. and the Salvadoran military 
was the massacre of a Salvadoran village, El Mozote, in December of 1981. Anywhere 
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from 900-1200 civilians, a majority of which were children, were lined up and shot by the 
Salvadoran army’s Atlacatl Battalion. The Battalion was created at the U.S. School of the 
Americas in Panama and trained at Fort Bragg in North Carolina (Goldston). Amid a 
Congressional debate regarding aid, reports of the massacre were denied by U.S. 
officials, even with the published testimony of an eyewitness who escaped the attack 
(Danner). It wasn’t until the remnants of the mass grave were dug up a decade later that 
U.S. media acknowledge the terrorism (125). Military aid and training continued amid 
reports of abuses like these. 
 
D’Aubuisson: No Stranger to the U.S. 
Within the first year of his presidency, President Reagan made clear the 
commitment to his doctrine. The focus was and would continue to be the rollback of 
communist influence in El Salvador. This placed D’Aubuisson on the right side in terms 
of U.S. aggression—he, too, vehemently opposed the spread of communism, and 
actively worked to suppress it. As he brought the far-right together, he was certainly not 
overlooked by the U.S. government. In fact, he had already visited it. In April 1980, he 
traveled to the U.S. to visit congressional offices in Washington. In the tapes that would 
be distributed to Salvadoran military officials in attempts to gain support for a right-
wing coup, he claimed that he and his followers had “spoken with various senators in 
the capital and they asked [them] that [they] maintain until November…the Reagan 
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Republicans will win, and our luck will change” (Morley). Only months after his first visit, 
he returned, illegally as his visa had been revoked due to threats he made against U.S. 
diplomats in El Salvador, to hold a press conference on Capitol Hill sponsored by the 
American Legion and the American Security Council, a right-wing lobbying group 
(Morley). He also received sympathetic hearings from two U.S. officials who would be 
part of Reagan’s foreign-policy transition team and National Security Council staff 
(Morley).  
D’Aubuisson was already on the U.S. government’s radar, but Reagan’s 
administration received direct assessments of D’Aubuisson as well. The CIA’s National 
Foreign Assessment Center, at the request of NSA Advisor Richard Allen, produced a 
memorandum specifically regarding D’Aubuisson’s role in the war in March of 1981. The 
brief report characterized him as an “articulate and charismatic spokesman for the far 
right of El Salvador” who was “the principal henchman for wealthy landowners and the 
coordinator of right-wing death squads that [had] murdered several thousand 
suspected leftists and leftist sympathizers in 1980” (Morley). His associations were clear, 
as were his intentions. The excerpt below characterizes the intimate knowledge the 
Reagan administration already had on D’Aubuisson within the first 2 months of his 
presidency: 
While relatively intelligent, D’Aubuisson is egocentric, reckless, and perhaps 
mentally unstable. The philosophy he publicly espouses calls for the physical 
elimination of El Salvador’s leftist opposition, which he defines as anyone 
not supportive of the traditional status quo. His hatred of those he suspects 
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of harboring leftist sympathies motivated his visits to the US last spring. 
After his US visa was cancelled, D’Aubuisson traveled throughout Latin 
America seeking military and political support for his Broad National Front—
an ultra-conservative group of wealthy Salvadorans…D’Aubuisson could 
play a spoiler role by continuing to encourage right-wing terrorists—many 
of whom are enlisted personnel in the security forces—and by issuing 
inflammatory public declarations against the junta and those sympathetic 
to the reform process. D’Aubuisson’s penchant for action is underscored by 
his sponsorship of two unsuccessful coups during the past year. His efforts 
to turn back the clock on reform and initiate an all-out civil war against the 
left could succeed if he manages to convince a majority of the officer 
corps—most of whom have rightist sympathies—that the new US 
administration would accept an ouster of the Christian Democrats from the 
government. (El Salvador: the Role of Roberto d’Aubuisson) 
 
This was not the only official assessment made of D’Aubuisson, however. A 1984 CIA 
report detailing right-wing terrorism in El Salvador specifically noted D’Aubuisson and 
ARENA as having “consolidated power” in such a way that allowed them to act “with 
relative impunity” against those they perceived to be enemies (Briefing Paper). It also 
directly implicates D’Aubuisson as the leader of the paramilitary death squads that are 
part of ARENA, noting that one of its offsets, the Secret Anti-Communist Army (ESA), 
attacked D’Aubuisson in a communique to cover his association. The report lists at least 
seven actions directly related to ARENA, including the “assassination of PDC mayors and 
party workers prior to the 1982 elections”; the “setting off of four bombs in San Salvador 
on September 6 ,1983”; the “torture and killing of supposed guerillas”; and “machine-
gunning PDC headquarters on June 7, 1983” (Briefing Paper). In addition to 
D’Aubuisson’s role, the report explicitly states the existence of death squads among the 
National Police and the National Guard.  
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 Despite the knowledge of D’Aubuisson’s associations and wrongdoing’s in El 
Salvador, the U.S. government remained committed to its fight against communism in 
the country, even if that meant allowing a different kind of enemy to operate freely. This 
is largely because of D’Aubuisson’s influence over the right in El Salvador, who still 
pushed for full right-wing control over the government. The U.S. had given implicit 
support for Duarte and the PDC during the 1984 elections, as their moderate views were 
ideal for the U.S. pursuit of upholding democracy in El Salvador, via the refusal to grant 
D’Aubuisson a visa during the campaign. However, only months after Duarte was 
declared the winner, D’Aubuisson was granted a visa to visit the U.S. after the uproar 
caused by El Salvador’s election results. The goal for the administration was to persuade 
D’Aubuisson to support the new election of Duarte in El Salvador, without which, the 
U.S. believed, would make Duarte “vulnerable to intrigue and plots that could make it 
impossible for him to carry out democratic reforms and rally the Salvadoran people 
behind efforts to defeat leftist guerillas” (Goshko). Officials had expressed how 
continued chaos in this way could also cause Congress and the American public to push 
for abandoning Reagan’s policies and demand the U.S. pull out from Central America. 
D’Aubuisson’s support was crucial for the U.S. government—though he was not their 
choice for leader of El Salvador, his influence in the country was vital to U.S. foreign 
policy. However, their invitation of D’Aubuisson to Washington revealed the focus of the 
administration on uniting El Salvador against the left, as the reinstation of his visa came 
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only a month after his implication in an assassination plot against U.S. ambassador to El 
Salvador Thomas R. Pickering (Goshko). U.S. officials who spoke on the matter refused 
to be identified.   
In contrast to former Ambassador Robert White’s assessment of D’Aubuisson as a 
“pathological killer” with a “sick mind,” President Reagan’s ambassador to El Salvador, 
Deane R. Hinton, worked to repair the relationship between the U.S. Embassy and the 
Salvadoran right (Severo). A former aide of Hinton’s described the ambassador’s “almost 
father-son” relationship with D’Aubuisson, saying that Hinton “thought he could channel 
[D’Aubuisson], push him along the democratic path, and theoretically curb his more 
violent tendencies” (Bonner). The aid, however, felt that Hinton “created a monster in 
the process” (Bonner). Hinton also vehemently opposed any suggestion that the 
presidential election results had been inflated or tampered with, rejecting investigation 
attempts by local universities (Bonner). Additionally, State Department officials 
frequently claimed to have no knowledge of D’Aubuisson’s association with death 
squads and Romero’s assassination, despite CIA reporting and Robert White’s testimony 
claiming otherwise (Krauss).  
  
Friends on Capitol Hill 
 D’Aubuisson was not only known amongst department officials, but amongst 
Congressional members as well. As a prominent leader in El Salvador, Senators and 
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Representatives on both sides of the political aisle were aware of his influence in the 
country, and this was crucial as Congress made decisions regarding foreign aid and 
policy towards the country. As the Reagan Administration pushed for increased military 
aid, factions of Congress split and noted the U.S.’s clear position for supporting the right 
and El Salvador’s government, despite reports of human rights abuses.  
In a July 1982 Congressional record, several members of the House of 
Representatives spoke regarding support for a bill that would extend the Presidential 
Certification process required for approving foreign aid to El Salvador. The bill was 
brought forth in response to the little progress made in the cases of 6 slain Americans, 
including the 4 nuns, as well as a missing journalist. House Representative Gerry Studds 
brought up the peculiarity regarding the fact that the Salvadoran and U.S. governments 
had evidence linking El Salvador’s security forces to the slaying of the nuns, yet a trial 
had not even been set for the guardsmen. Representative Richard Ottinger additionally 
noted how over 12,000 civilians had been killed in the previous 18 months, and the 
movement of El Salvador into a more dangerous and unstable situation. Ottinger 
relayed additional concern for the “investiture of power in the hands of one of the most 
brutal human rights violators in El Salvador, Roberto D’Aubuisson” in the Assembly 
elections held months prior (Congressional Record - House, 97th Congress). 
D’Aubuisson’s role, as well as the Salvadoran government’s, in violent conflict in El 
Salvador was not unknown to members of Congress. However, as one senior 
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Congressman claimed, the certification process “put the ambassadors and the assistant 
secretaries in an impossible situation” since the Administration “would certify, no matter 
what” to continue its goal of combatting leftist aggression (Secretary of State’s Panel on 
El Salvador).   
D’Aubuisson certainly did not have an explicit or formative backing by the 
legislative branch in the U.S. by any means. His extremism made him generally 
unpopular as his alleged death squad ties would have undermined the U.S.’s outspoken 
commitment to a fair democracy that upholds human rights. However, Congress 
certainly displayed its commitment to “rolling back” leftist aggression through its 
regular approval of military aid to El Salvador’s government, despite claims that it, too, 
did not make efforts regarding the progression of human rights. This presented a 
situation favorable to D’Aubuisson—if policy stayed focus on curbing the left, which he 
was dedicated to, as well, he would remain outside of U.S. targets.  
U.S. party lines certainly played a role, as well. In a 1990 Congressional record, 
Democratic Representative Gerry Studds voiced support for a bill that would increase 
aid cuts to El Salvador if both the government and FMLN were not held accountable for 
violence. Republican House Representative Dan Burton responded in opposition, 
emphasizing that the “democratically-elected government in El Salvador is threatened 
by the communist FMLN” (Congressional Record - House, 101st Congress). The bill in 
question passed in the Democratic Majority of the House, falling roughly along party 
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lines. Though opinions did not always fall strictly along party lines, Congressional 
records during this time period displayed Republicans’ general emphasis on combatting 
communism amid debates regarding accountability of the Salvadoran military in 
leveraging aid. The anti-communist focus of U.S. foreign policy created an environment 
in which government officials were arguably more open to supporting the likes of 
people such as D’Aubuisson versus any leaders associated with the left.  
D’Aubuisson was well-received only among some conservative members. Though 
his visa was denied three times between 1980 and 1984, the Reagan administration’s 
invitation of D’Aubuisson after El Salvador’s presidential elections included a 90-minute 
session with a small number of Republican senators and only Democratic senator. 
Republicans in attendance openly and unabashedly advocated for D’Aubuisson. One 
Senator accused D’Aubuisson’s critics of “stacking the rhetorical deck against him” in 
accusations of death squad associations, describing negative sentiment as “cheap, left-
wing McCarthyism” (Smith). “It’s the same old story,” the senator said, “you repeat a big 
lie often enough, then people begin to believe it…there is no proof of it…the CIA doesn’t 
have any proof, no one does” (Smith). There was perhaps no member of Congress who 
advocated more fervently for D’Aubuisson than Republican Senator Jesse Helms, who 
was seen as a “friend and ally” to D’Aubuisson (Bonner). He claimed in a 1984 Senatorial 
record that the CIA funneled money to the PDC in the 1984 elections. He believed the 
PDC was associated with leftist guerillas, saying that Duarte had ties to Marxist-Leninism 
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and that voter suppression against the right in El Salvador was pervasive (Congressional 
record – Senate, 101st Congress). He presented evidence claiming D’Aubuisson was 
“stigmatized” as the far-right, claiming that Washington “must be absolutely clear, 
communism is the enemy in Central America” and that there was “no substitute for 
military victory over the Communist forces” (Congressional Record – Senate, 101st 
Congress).  
Many Congressional leaders subsequently voiced favorable views on 
D’Aubuisson, and it was not limited to Republican members. D’Aubuisson did well at 
presenting himself, but it also helped that the leader received $200,000 worth of PR 
from the U.S. advertising agency McCann-Erickson for his 1982 campaign (Lafeber 14). 
Former House Majority Leader James C. Wright of Texas described D’Aubuisson as “an 
intense, keyed-up young man” after sitting next to him at post-election dinner at El 
Salvador’s U.S. Embassy in 1982 (McGory). “I believed him when he said he wants a 
government of national reconciliation” Wright continued, “He says he will offer amnesty 
to the guerrillas in all cases except crimes involving murder and kidnapping…[he said] 
those could not forgo punishment” (McGory). There is no record of D’Aubuisson 
granting amnesty to any guerilla member during his tenure as Assembly president. 
Wright’s assessment, however, only added to the growing tolerance of D’Aubuisson as a 
forceful presence in El Salvador’s political sphere. 
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The U.S. was not responsible for D’Aubuisson’s actions; however, given the 
knowledge of him and his associations, the government certainly played a role in 
allowing his continued operations. The message was clear from the U.S.: communism 
must be stopped. Though the right was not the only side to commit serious abuses, it 
was implicitly permitted to continue. Little was done by the U.S. to stop right-wing 
forces, and this granted D’Aubuisson an uninhibited path to maintain his leadership role 
in El Salvador.  
 
 
Part Three: The War’s End  
 
Cristiani and ARENA’s Transition 
 
 After D’Aubuisson’s defeat in the presidential elections in 1984, he subsequently 
resigned from party leader of ARENA in March of 1985. “I asked to be replaced, and 
although there was some resistance, the party later understood my decision” he stated 
in a December 1985 interview (“ARENA’s D’Aubuisson Replaced by Cristiani”). Months 
later, successful coffee oligarch and U.S.-educated businessman Alfredo Cristiani was 
voted to replace Roberto D’Aubuisson as Secretary General (the highest position) of the 
party. This exchange of power marked a new transition for ARENA as Cristiani was then 
elected party leader in 1986. As accusations of D’Aubuisson’s associations became 
pervasive, as well as his extremist ideals, ARENA leaders, along with D’Aubuisson 
himself, felt the party needed a new candidate for the next round of presidential 
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elections. D’Aubuisson was consistently attacked by the PDC and far left for his political 
and military past. It was clear that attempts for ARENA to achieve the highest political 
office could not rest under the explicit leadership of D’Aubuisson. The party wanted 
control, and D’Aubuisson had too many allegations against him. Whether he truly made 
the decision to resign himself or was forced out of the party is unknown, but the former 
remains likely. In the 1985 interview, he described how he “asked the assembly to 
analyze [their] current situation, the convenience of replacing certain leaders…to allow 
for a better organization and leadership of the party” (“ARENA’s D’Aubuisson Replaced 
by Cristiani”). He was named “Honorary President for Life” and remained active in the 
party through its political and military training sectors.  
At the core of D’Aubuisson’s beliefs regarding El Salvador was the pursuit for 
suppressing communist rule. While his party’s explicit leadership fell unto a new, fresh 
political voice, he remained adamant that this was what the party needed to move 
forward successfully. “It is not fair to hurt the entire organization when they are only 
trying to hurt me,” D’Aubuisson explained regarding the transition (Contreras). It was 
important to have a leader who did “not have the past that could be used by the PDC to 
attack ARENA” (Contreras). He stated how accusations greatly increased near elections, 
and it was best for the party that he does not remain in his position. However, he 
certainly did not lose his status in ARENA and El Salvador as a prominent and influential 
leader. One of ARENA’s key objectives was to establish a political institute to train young 
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men, youths, and political leaders, and he remained dedicated to helping the party 
expand. Armando Calderón Sol, leader of an ARENA faction and a deputy in the 
Legislative Assembly, stated that “D’Aubuisson continues to be the symbol of anti-
communism in El Salvador and the entire continent” (Contreras). D’Aubuisson did not 
lose the confidence of ARENA, only his title in the party.  
 Cristiani’s ascension into ARENA proved to be successful for the party. He 
expressed similar core views to D’Aubuisson in economic and social policy—he 
remained committed to privatization of the National Bank, promoting business in El 
Salvador, and curbing FMLN influence. However, key to his role as ARENA’s leader and 
eventual presidential candidate was a greater willingness to negotiate with the left and 
enact a more moderate approach to policy. Cristiani stressed the need to “set aside 
partisanship, arrogance, and divisionism,” while still espousing D’Aubuisson’s historical 
calls for “national unity” (“ARENA Discusses”). He took a similar approach towards 
criticizing the Christian Democrats, saying their party’s leader President Duarte was 
“putting on a tasteless political show” as “time [was] going by and he has not done 
anything for the people yet” (“ARENA Head Criticizes”). Cristiani focused on pursuing a 
“clean, democratic” presidential election, yet ensured that, despite differences with the 
PDC, “ARENA would support the laws announced by President Duarte that benefit the 
nation and see to it that they are implemented” (“ARENA Discusses”).  
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As Cristiani denounced Duarte yet voiced support for cooperation when it best 
supported the Salvadoran people, ARENA was able to express a more realistic image for 
unification amongst the people and gain a greater following that led to successful 1988 
legislative election results. It helped, additionally, that the PDC was facing significant 
challenges to the party’s strength. The economic policies it implemented proved to fail 
in the country, and there was no progress in terms of peace talks with the FMLN. 
Additionally, with a right-wing majority in the Legislative Assembly, the Assembly 
pushed for corruption investigations that proved there was at least some degree of 
corruption in the PDC-dominated government (Montgomery 218). This weakened their 
following amongst the Salvadoran people, and as disagreements arose within the PDC 
regarding presidential candidates, leading members eventually split off to form new 
parties. With President Duarte diagnosed with stomach and liver cancer, the PDC no 
longer maintained the following and leadership strength it once did. When the 
presidential elections in 1989 came, ARENA came out with 56% of popular vote, and 
Alfredo Cristiani was named El Salvador’s new executive leader (Montgomery 215).  
D’Aubuisson’s plan worked magnificently. The moderate image that Cristiani 
provided for ARENA gave them power over the government, and D’Aubuisson 
maintained significant power over the party itself. He remained at Cristiani’s side on the 
campaign trail, often inserting himself at events and chose ARENA’s vice-presidential 
candidate, Francisco Merino (Montgomery 213). In his inauguration address, Cristiani 
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outlined a five-point plan for peace talks with the FMLN, a position supported by 76% of 
Salvadorans at the time (Montgomery 216). D’Aubuisson himself supported this line of 
action, and even released a detailed proposal for conducting FMLN talks that Cristiani’s 
administration would later put into place. “We need to hold ongoing dialogue for the 
duration of these negotiations,” D’Aubuisson stated in a 1989 interview, “anyone who 
lays down his weapons will be allowed to sign the amnesty” (“D’Aubuisson Announces”). 
While he certainly remained an impassioned believer against the influence of 




 The road to peace was long for El Salvador. With President Cristiani finally getting 
to the table with the FMLN in September of 1989, there would not be a cease-fire in El 
Salvador for another two years. U.N.-brokered talks occurred twice times before the end 
of 1989, and both sides called for a cease-fire to end the war by January of 1990. 
However, bombings on the homes of prominent center-left leaders, churches, and El 
Salvador’s largest trade union federation occurred only days after their second meeting 
in October. President Cristiani promised for a full investigation of the attacks, but none 
occurred. This signaled to the FMLN that the government was not serious about laying 
down their arms and prompted a continuation of their offensives. Death squad violence 
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sharply increased as well, and it seemed that El Salvador was nowhere close to seeing 
the end of conflict. 
The 1991 Legislative elections proved to incite violence even further. As the 
global collapse of communism occurred, ARENA saw the possible exponential increase 
in their power. President Cristiani’s Deputy Chief of Staff claimed that they were “looking 
not only at one or two more terms, but a longer period of domination for a center-right 
party” (Norton). However, this positive outlook did not prevent the party from 
committing massive fraud, as it had already been proven to do in previous elections. 
Leftist sympathizers were threatened, fired from jobs, beaten up, and their offices were 
frequently surrounded by troops and bombed (Norton). The Democratic National 
Unity’s candidate and his pregnant wife were threatened to be killed if he did not resign 
from the race; days later, they were machine-gunned to death. Another National Unity 
candidate was shot in the eye by an ARENA gunman (Norton). On election day, the 
ARENA-dominated Central Elections Council changed polling places at the last minute in 
areas with strong Christian Democrat support, while also delivering ballot boxes late and 
causing them to open hours after voting officially began. Tens of thousands of names 
also disappeared from the voting lists, so many who had registered voting cards were 
not allowed to vote. ARENA won many towns that were slated to do well among the 
center-left by margins as small as 200 votes (Norton). One Latin American diplomat 
stated directly that “ARENA did everything possible to obstruct the vote of the 
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opposition” and political analysts in the region indicated that “there was clearly fraud” 
(Norton). However, the official U.S. observation team for the election, which sent only 
160 observers compared to the 700 sent to Nicaragua’s elections despite the country 
only having half of El Salvador’s population, declared the election “free and fair” 
(Norton). Though it received 10% less votes than it did in 1989, it still came out with the 
largest share of the popular vote and retained its control over the Assembly through its 
continued alliance with the right-wing PCN.  
Peace talks resumed after the elections, but both sides seemed to be in a 
deadlock. The biggest issue facing progression was ARENA’s unwillingness to make 
concessions regarding the National Guard, a position which D’Aubuisson was specifically 
accused of spearheading (Montomgery 230). Without the power of the military to 
enforce the right-wing’s position, the true control it maintained over the country was 
lost. Thus, it refused to move forward. “There’s a complete lack of understanding in the 
party of the need to make concessions,” one Western diplomat remarked, “there’s an 
utter conviction in the government and the U.S. that the FMLN is effectively beat…the 
government, the right, the army, and even the U.S. are believing their own propaganda 
again” (Norton). Without pressure from the U.S. to make concessions, peace talks were 
near impossible. One foreign analyst noted that, although many U.S. officials were 
critical of the military, “their hatred for the FMLN is so great they end up supporting the 
army” (Norton). However, despite the global turn away from communism, the FMLN had 
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proven by 1991 to be ideologically distant from Marxism, with leaders denouncing much 
of its tenets. The FMLN guerillas had grown stronger and more sophisticated and was 
not likely to just “disappear” as many Salvadoran officials believed.  
Despite ARENA’s legislative success and the U.S.’s continued support for El 
Salvador’s government, it was clear that peace must be achieved. Violence still occurred 
at great rates, and Cristiani finally made some concessions regarding the military, 
electoral systems, and the creation of United Nations Truth Commission to investigate 
human rights abuses. Unsurprisingly, many right-wing death squads and anticommunist 
groups reacted violently, issuing threats against those who supported the United 
Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador and continuing murders and disappearance 
against civilians (Montgomery 224). However, international pressure from Spain, Mexico, 
Venezuela, and Colombia pushed President Cristiani to move further with talks with the 
FMLN, and D’Aubuisson himself made what would be his last public speech urging 
ARENA to support Cristiani and the peace process (Montgomery 224). Both sides gave 
concessions, and finally on December 31st both sides participated in an unofficial cease-
fire. On January 16, 1992, formal peace accords were signed in Chapultepec, Mexico, 
and a formal cease-fire began on February 1st. The National Guard became the National 
Civilian Police, and the FMLN became an official political party. Two weeks later, Roberto 
D’Aubuisson died from tongue and throat cancer, having seen his party achieve the 
peace he had called for since 1979.  
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Part Four: Weaknesses of the Salvadoran State 
Roberto D’Aubuisson maintained massive influence during El Salvador’s Civil War. 
His role as an extreme yet charismatic leader proved to gather support for him and his 
political party, ARENA. While D’Aubuisson’s greatest achievement is arguably the 
creation of a party still dominant in the present-day, the circumstances he took 
advantage of and the tactics that he employed during the war reveal a greater legacy: 
exposure of the core issues that have plagued El Salvador to this day. The economic, 
security, and political problems that were never addressed after the war’s end and have 
prevented the country from achieving great peace and prosperity are revealed in 
looking at D’Aubuisson’s rise to power. 
 
Politically 
 In looking at D’Aubuisson’s political role in El Salvador, there are distinct facets 
that hindered El Salvador before, during, and after the war. D’Aubuisson contributed 
directly and indirectly to these facets, but overall, he exemplified some of the key 
political issues in the country that were not addressed in the 1992 Peace Accords. 
Corruption was rampant in the country and two major political parties, ARENA and 
FMLN, dominated Salvadoran politics until the 2019 election of independent candidate 
Nayib Bukele.  
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 When Roberto D’Aubuisson founded ARENA in 1981, he envisioned a long-
lasting presence of the party in El Salvador. Whether it was the timing of the party’s 
founding, coming in during a period without a strong right-wing coalition, or 
D’Aubuisson’s own leadership, or some combination of factors that placed ARENA as 
the largest political party in El Salvador, it resulted in a 20-year presidential reign. 
ARENA won every election from 1989-2009 and had the largest percentage of 
Legislative Assembly seats from 1988-2000, coming in second only from 2003-2012 and 
regaining the majority in 2015 and 2018. It remains El Salvador’s largest right-wing 
party. However, ARENA’s associations with corruption and election fraud did not stop 
with D’Aubuisson’s death in 1992. One of the major associations of the party has been 
with gangs, with which ARENA has been known to “strike pacts” allowing extortion and 
execution of rival politicians (Zaidi). Bribes have also been pervasive for both ARENA and 
the FMLN. Additionally, at least two former ARENA presidents have been convicted of 
embezzlement and money laundering. The party’s current leader was also arrested in 
August of 2020 for the same charges (Patricio). ARENA is not the only party with 
connections to corruption, however; a former FMLN president was indicted for 
embezzlement as well. Allegations of corruption have run rampant against both the 
FMLN and ARENA, and while most have gone uninvestigated and unproven, it is clear 
that the formidable presence of both parties is tainted with the same civil war-era 
fraudulency.   
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Arguably D’Aubuisson’s biggest revelation for El Salvador’s political sphere was 
his polarizing rhetoric to the Salvadoran people. Though wartime conditions naturally 
created a stark division among left and right-wing supporters, D’Aubuisson’s 
condemnation of the left, and creation of a political party centered around combatting 
leftist thought, heightened El Salvador’s already significantly polarized population. The 
country remains one of Latin America’s most polarized countries today. In a 2016 
research study, El Salvador ranked highest in party polarization compared to 17 other 
Latin American countries (Singer 182). While it is easy to look at D’Aubuisson’s rhetoric 
during the war as largely a product of Cold War sentiments, it was extremely telling of 
the divide of the left and right ideologies in El Salvador that had never been properly 
rectified. After the Peace Accords, the country continued to be as polarized as ever. This 
polarization has magnified challenges to address important security and policing 
challenges in the country as it has prevented the two sides to come together to enact 
formidable, bipartisan policies (Country Report).  
Historical precedence of division between the left and right in El Salvador 
certainly indicates that polarization had already existed for decades; however, analysis of 
D’Aubuisson’s rhetoric and political action simply sheds greater light on its prominence 
in the country. A 2018 Congressional Research report stated explicitly that “ARENA 
sought to rebuild democracy…but did not effectively address inequality, violence, and 
corruption” (Seelke). If government officials had looked not at subduing the opposition 
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but cooperating to enact policy, the country may have been able to better address many 
of the dire situations it has faced since then.  
  
Security and the Judicial System 
 Throughout the war, D’Aubuisson placed great emphasis on the need for the 
Salvadoran armed forces. He believed that these forces were key to subduing the leftist 
guerillas, espousing the idea that they could be fully trusted to act for the Salvadoran 
people and should receive unwavering support. The issue, he argued, rest within those 
in control of the government itself. He created alliances with military officials and 
utilized them as part of his paramilitary death squad operations. This coalition also 
extended into the country’s judicial system, where army officials who were charged with 
crimes rarely saw punitive action or even trials. D’Aubuisson’s arrest and quick release is 
only one of numerous instances in which military members walked free. Many never saw 
charges made against them to begin with. These issues within the judicial and military 
systems have also been exacerbated by U.S. support. While significantly less military aid 
is sent compared to wartime years, which has arguably contributed to the difficulties of 
the police to gain proper training, there is still a trend of U.S. aid funding questionable 
areas of El Salvador’s policing force.  
D’Aubuisson’s military coalition was key in his rise to power, and also reveals a 
significant downfall in El Salvador that has yet to be properly addressed: the country’s 
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judicial system and the government’s lack of control over security forces. In the UN’s 
1993 Truth Commission Report on El Salvador’s war, authors stated blatantly that “the 
lack of effective action by the judicial system…reinforced the impunity that shielded and 
continues to shield members and promoters of death squads” (Betancur). A 2018 US 
Department of State report states a similar assessment, that “impunity persists despite 
government steps to dismiss and prosecute officials who had committed 
abuses…partially due to inefficiency and corruption in the judiciary” (Country Report). 
The judiciary system, along with the National Civilian Police, has gone underfunded, and 
there are serious concerns regarding corruption in the police, prisons, and judicial 
system as a whole (Seelke). Since the disbandment of the National Guard in 1992, the 
Civilian Police has remained underfunded and undertrained. There is a large disparity 
between previous funding for the National Guard and current funding for the Civilian 
Police, however; the National Guard had previously operated with over $1 billion in 
military aid from the U.S. between 1980 and 1990, or approximately $100 million per 
year (El Salvador: Military Assistance 2). Though it has certainly varied by year in the past 
decades, in 2019 the military received approximately $19 million in aid (“U.S. Foreign 
Aid”). The National Guard and armed forces spent a decade building up their arsenal 
and training with U.S. funds, and without the same funding for the Civilian Police it is 
not surprising to see security forces revert back to historical trends of violence and 
corruption. With deficient wages, training, and infrastructure, “corruption, weak 
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investigatory capacity, and an inability to prosecute officers accused of corruption and 
human rights abuses have hindered police performance” (Seelke).  
The lack of a properly organized, funded, and trained policing and judicial system 
has exacerbated issues regarding gang-related violence. As gang-violence has greatly 
contributed to the country’s high homicide rates in the decades since the war, the 
government has maintained a hard emphasis on aggressive anti-gang policies amongst 
security forces. Implemented by ARENA presidents, La Mano Dura (“Firm Hand”) and 
Super Mano Dura (“Super Firm Hand”) instigated a zero-tolerance policy for gangs, 
leading to “the immediate imprisonment of a gang member simply for having gang-
related tattoos or flashing gang signs in public” (Rodgers). The original policy resulted in 
tens of thousands of gang members as young as 12 years old imprisoned and was 
subsequently ruled unconstitutional (Rodgers). The second form of the strategy was 
highly criticized by the UN and human rights groups and was replaced upon the 
election of the country’s first FMLN president, who attempted to instill gang suppression 
laws and a Mano Amiga (“Helping Hand”) policy that went largely underfunded and 
proved to be ineffective (Wolf).  
The inconsistent and aggressive policies towards gangs have led to exacerbated 
human rights abuses by the country’s underpaid and undertrained security forces. The 
rise in gang violence also led to a 2009 authorization of the military to carry out police 
functions, a decree which is still in place today. According to U.S. estimates, 8,000 of El 
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Salvador’s 17,000 active-duty armed forces are involved in public security at any given 
time (Seelke). The use of private security for protection from gangs has increased as 
well. The anti-gang policies and military involvement has led to an increase in 
extrajudicial killings and maltreatment of suspected gang members. In 2017, four police 
officers and ten soldiers were arrested under suspected involvement in 36 murders 
between 2014 and 2016 (Seelke). The same year, evidence was released that death 
squads were operating within the police, leading to convictions of at least six officers for 
participating in these death squads (Seelke). However, 96% of investigations against 
Salvadoran police are dismissed in the first 72 hours, with few resulting in convictions 
(“US-Funded Police”). 
U.S. complacency towards the human rights abuses committed by government 
forces did not necessarily disappear with the National Guard. The U.S. increased aid in 
the early 2000’s in support of El Salvador’s Mano Dura policy towards gangs, and there 
has been links to U.S. funding units within El Salvador’s police that commit extrajudicial 
killings of gang members. One unit allegedly killed 43 members in the first six months of 
2018, and though it was disbanded, members created a new unit of the same caliber; 
both units received U.S. funding (“US-Funded Police”). Unit officers have confirmed U.S. 
training as well, leading to the growing question of whether it is complicit in the actions 
for the sake of subduing gang forces.   
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 In assessing the issues that plague El Salvador’s security and judicial systems, it is 
not hard to see the origins of these difficulties. Historically, El Salvador’s military 
coalition with the oligarchy led to decades of military rule. The independent power of 
the National Guard was expansive, often undermining the presidential leadership of 
military officials themselves. It was clear during the war that this power went 
unmanaged and unaddressed, as D’Aubuisson took advantage of in furthering his own 
pursuits for the country’s right wing. After the war’s end, the creation of a Civilian Police 
incorporated all sides of El Salvador, including former insurgents, former police, and 
non-combatants, to create an independent law enforcement agency under civilian 
control and separate from the armed forces. The purpose of these forces was to set hard 
expectations regarding human rights and avoid the dangerous use of military force on 
civilians. However, this has proven to change little in the country. The abuses committed 
by the National Guard had been justified as stopping leftist guerillas; now, it is justified 
as stopping the gangs. In 2016 the Director General of the Civilian Police, Mauricio 
Landaverde, stated that “all members of the PNC that have to use weapons against 
criminals due to their work as officers should do so with complete confidence…the 
government and the PNC will protect them” (Olson). D’Aubuisson expressed similar 
sentiment when regarding the armed forces actions against leftist guerillas. The 
structure of security, the funding of the judicial system, and a seeming belief that crime 
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can only be subdued by increased force, were all issues thirty years ago that have yet to 
be properly addressed.  
 
Economic Disparity 
 One of D’Aubuisson’s most important alliances was with the wealthy Salvadoran 
oligarchs and landowners. The income inequality preceding the war only worsened as 
the economy plummeted during the war, and D’Aubuisson’s economic policies, while 
certainly shifting in focus depending upon the income levels of the crowds he spoke to, 
blatantly promoted the reinvigoration of the private sector in El Salvador. The focus 
remained on boosting the economy through increasing the wealth of El Salvador’s 
richest, rather than addressing disparities impacting lower classes. This has led the 
country into a difficult economic situation and has also given way to the spread of 
gangs in lower income areas.   
Since the war’s end, income disparity has certainly decreased. However, 
throughout the 1990s poverty rates remained above fifty percent, and did not fall below 
forty percent until 2012 (103). Today, a third of the population remains below the 
poverty line (“El Salvador Poverty Rate 1989-2020”). The highest percentage of poverty, 
however, remains amongst the rural areas in the country. A 2015 report assessed the 
58.5% of all rural households, which make up thirty percent of the nation’s population, 
suffered from deprivations associated with poverty (Seelke). Natural disasters and 
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droughts that have plagued the country throughout the last two decades have limited 
the country’s economic growth as well. Political polarization has severely impacted the 
ability of the government to enact expansive economic policies. While the country has 
experienced economic growth compared to 1992 rates, it relies heavily on foreign aid 
and remittances from workers in other countries, primarily the U.S. (Seelke). The 
education of the labor force is also severely impacted—adequate education and training 
to meet the country’s labor needs is severely lacking, contributing to low economic 
growth (Seelke).   
 One of the biggest factors impacting El Salvador’s economic growth is security 
issues related to gang violence. The principal way they receive funding is through the 
extortion of businesses, requiring daily amounts of $2-$3 for small-businesses and $5-
$20 for medium-sized businesses and distributors (Zaidi). The result is the extortion of 
seventy percent of the country’s businesses, resulting in estimated revenues of over $30 
million per year going to a single gang (Zaidi). The money spent due to gangs and the 
money lost due to violence amounts to $15 billion, or 15% of the country’s GDP (Zaidi). 
It is a cycle, however; gangs have grown more pervasive in lower-income areas, usually 
gaining the membership of youth who suffer from unemployment, family separation, 
scarce educational opportunities, and poverty (Fogelbach). The country has certainly 
come a long way in addressing income disparities, but with low economic growth it is 
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hard for a large portion of the population to see increases in wealth. Gangs have taken 
advantage of these impoverished areas, allowing their influence and power to spread.  
 
Conclusion 
 Roberto D’Aubuisson was a charismatic manipulator, who took advantage of the 
problems in El Salvador to rise to prominence. In many ways, he exacerbated certain 
issues, such as political polarization and emphasis on the military; in others, he was 
simply representative of larger problems, such as the income inequality and U.S. 
complacency towards actors espousing similar beliefs. While D’Aubuisson is not solely 
responsible for the conflict-ridden path El Salvador has experienced since the end of the 
war, the elements allowing his rise to power display the broader, fundamental situations 
that have hindered the country and its citizens. In looking at this one leader, key 
weaknesses within El Salvador are revealed as well as actors who have aided in their 
continuation. These weaknesses are certainly not finite in scope, but have had a 
significant, lasting impact on the country. And though it is not to say El Salvador ignored 
or did not work to correct many situations that D’Aubuisson’s analysis revealed, 
oftentimes more immediate problems, like gang violence, seem to get in the way of 
addressing the sources of the problems themselves, like the judicial system and 
economic situations feeding into gangs’ expansion. For other countries that have 
experienced long-lasting violence and conflict like El Salvador, it may be essential to 
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look at prominent figures in the country to find the elements that allowed them to rise 
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